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This dissertation studies the progress and impacts of State-Owned Enterprises
(SOEs) reforms in China. The primary interests center on impacts of non-ownershipchange reforms and privatization on Chinese SOEs’ productivity and efficiency. The
research comprises of three major sections.
Section one briefly reviews the history of SOEs’ reform in China and examines the
changes in some selected performance indicators with help of a comprehensive dataset on
863 Chinese firms from 1995 to 2001. In addition, causes of Chinese SOEs’ privatization
and determinants of firms’ inefficiency are also studied.
Section two examines the effects of privatization and non-ownership-change
reforms on firms’ productivity in China. As one of the most prominent empirical
challenges in China privatization studies, the endogeneity problems are addressed with a
first-difference instrumental variable GMM estimation. The estimation results show that
privatization does not improve firms’ productivity immediately. Instead, its effects
become significantly positive in the year after conversion. In addition, partial
privatization fails to lead to improved efficiency whereas insider privatization boosts
firms’ productivity shortly after the first year of privatization but the effects quickly fade
after two years of privatization. Lastly, all non-ownership-change reforms, except leasing,

are proved to be ineffective even when issues like social burdens, worker redundancy,
management incentives and soft-budget constraint are tackled before the restructuring.
To shed light on impacts of privatization on firms’ technical efficiency, Section
three proposes a two-step stochastic frontier model. The first step addresses the
endogeneity issue by estimating the probability of privatization with a random effects
probit model. The second step estimation investigates the causes of Chinese
manufacturing’s inefficiency with a random-effects stochastic frontier model. The
estimation results suggest that privatization, hardening budget constraint and reducing
firms’ social obligations have significantly contributed to the improvements of firms’
efficiency. However, no evidence is found that more autonomy for managers and lower
debt asset ratio may help improve firms’ efficiency.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

China’s economic reforms in the last three decades have dramatically transformed
the once centralized economy to a mixed one with a vibrant market-oriented component.
This transformation was achieved with a series of comprehensive economic
restructurings. Beginning with granting more production autonomy to farmers in the late
1970s, the emphasis of this restructuring subsequently was shifted to improving
performance of a large number of Stated-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which, at the time,
contributed to the majority of Chinese industrial output 1 and yet was synonymous to
inefficiency and poor productivity. Unlike other former centrally planned economies,
which adopted various mass privatization programs to dismantle their SOEs, China, on
the contrary, undertook a much more diverse and gradual approach.
Enterprise Reform in China and Motivations for This Study
The progress of enterprise reform in China can be summarized into two stages.
The first stage only involves various reform initiatives avoiding relinquishing state
ownership. This stage will be referred as “restructuring” hereafter in this study. The
adoption of such a conservative approach was largely attributed to the initial objectives of
Chinese government on SOEs’ reform, which were to merely boost performance by
altering firms’ internal governance and creating a market-oriented environment. Due to

1

Yusuf, Nabeshima and Perkins (2006) find that close to 80 percent of China’s industrial GDP was produced by SOEs
in 1978.
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political concerns, Chinese central government had always been more interested in
improving SOEs’ internal governance without further compromising state controls in
them. As a result, before privatization was officially endorsed, most of Chinese SOEs
have gone through two waves of restructuring. In the first wave of reforms, most of the
efforts were aimed at offering managers more incentives and granting firms with more
autonomy. Disappointed by the results of this wave of reforms, the second wave of SOE
reforms shifted its focus to clarifying property rights over firms’ assets and liabilities.
Incorporation emerged as the mostly adopted strategy during this wave of reforms.
However, the exchange of shares during incorporation reform was only allowed among
SOEs. Meanwhile, the drive toward creating a more market-oriented economy has
proceeded accordingly. It includes designating special economic zones, introducing a
dual-pricing system and lowering barriers for trade and foreign investments. Although
these reform initiatives and further market liberation have greatly stimulated the growth
of Chinese economy, the performance of Chinese SOEs instead had continually
deteriorated during 1980s.
To revitalize the reforms at SOEs, the second stage of Chinese SOEs reform
primarily focused on ownership diversion, in particular, privatization. This stage of
reform will be referred as “privatization” hereafter in this study. Privatization started to
receive earnest support from Chinese government in 1990s and gradually gained its
popularity among officials at different levels as means to improve firms’ performance and
reduce governments’ budget burdens.
This study is largely motivated by the ongoing debate on the impacts of
privatization in China. As one of the most controversial reforms in China, previous
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empirical studies have shown mixed results on the effects of privatization on Chinese
firms’ performance. Some researchers consider privatization as an effective solution to
the inherent inefficiency problems at Chinese SOEs. Bai, Lu and Tao (2009) find that
privatization in China leads to higher labor productivity and profitability and that these
impacts are sustainable in the long run. Amess, Du and Girma (2010) indicate that full
privatization significantly improves labor productivity, but destroys jobs in China. Their
results also show that in contrast to full privatization, partial privatization causes job
creation but only induces a smaller increase in labor productivity. After studying share
transferring among public-listed Chinese firms, Chen et al (2008) contend that positive
performance effects are normally associated with firms whose controlling shares were
transferred to private entities. Lin, Ma and Su (2009) examine the effects of various
corporate governances on Chinese public-listed firms’ productivity and find that a
dominating state ownership tends to suppress firms’ productivity.
However, numerous literature find privatization has no significant effect on firms’
performance improvement. To name few, Jiang, Yue, and Zhao (2009) show that
privatization among public-listed SOEs through share issuing exhibit no significant effect
on firms’ performance in 1990s. They argue that the failure of privatization on boosting
firms’ performance may be attributed to the weak institutional environment at the time.
That means private firms were very often discriminated against receiving bank loans or
subject to higher tax brackets than those of SOEs. Arriving with similar conclusions,
Yusuf, Nabeshima and Perkins (2006) estimate efficiency of firms with different
ownerships and show that, to one’s surprise, private and wholly-owned foreign
subsidiaries are ranked among the least efficient. As they speculate, lack of institutional
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support to private ownership, such as bank loans, fees, and taxes, may cause this
paradoxical result. Ng, Yuce, and Chen (2009) illustrate that the performance of Chinese
firms gains from ownership concentration. A strong state control can also improve firms’
performance.
In light of these mixed findings on effects of enterprise reforms on Chinese
firms’ performance, first, this study intends to revisit this debate by considering a more
comprehensive set of reform measures. These reform measures include not only
ownership diversification, such as privatization and incorporation but also some common
corporate governance reforms shared by SOEs and private firms in China, such as
excessive debt, social burden and soft-budget constraint etc. The primary purpose of
considering all of these reform measures is to prevent the estimated results on
privatization effects from being contaminated by effects from other reform measures.
Second, this study investigates the impact of enterprise reforms on two
performance indicators, namely productivity and technical efficiency. Productivity
measures the ratio of a firm’s output that it produces to the inputs that it utilizes. Figure 1
illustrates a simple single input and single output production frontier. The slope of a ray
through the origin can be interpreted as a measure of productivity. A maximum
productivity can be achieved if a firm produces at Point A by which a ray from the origin
is at the tangent to the production frontier. Technical efficiency measures deviations from
a firm’s observed output to its optimal output for the same amount of inputs. In Figure 1 a
firm is called being technically efficient if it can produce on the production frontier, such
as Point B; a firm producing underneath the production frontier thus is called being
technically inefficient, such as Point C.

4

Figure 1 clearly shows the differences between productivity and technical
efficiency. A firm which is technical efficient by producing at Point B can further
improve its productivity by moving from Points B to A. This productivity improvement
can be achieved by exploiting scales economies; such an improvement can also be
achieved with technological change if the model becomes dynamic; moreover, such an
improvement can also be made with increasing technical efficiency. Therefore, the
determinants of the distance from Points C to B are studied when one is interested in
estimating the causes of technical inefficiency in a firm. The determinants of the distance
from Points C or B to A are examined when one chooses to study the factors that may
help improve firms’ productivity.

Sources: Coelli et al (2005)

Figure 1. Productivity and Technical Efficiency

Since the primary interest of this study centers on the impact of enterprise reform
on Chinese SOEs, we need define each reform measures clearly. Enterprise reform
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measures considered in this study can be summarized into three categories, restructuring,
privatization and some corporate governance reforms shared by SOEs and private firms.
Restructuring
Following the lead of Garnaut et al (2005), we consider seven reform efforts as
restructuring. None of These reform measures considered here involves privatization in
which private shares dominate the control of a firm. These reform measures are internal
restructuring, bankruptcy, initial public offering (IPO), shareholding, open sales, lease
and joint venture.
Internal restructuring does not alter the ownership of a firm. It normally takes
affect through the form of incorporation; the bankruptcy law in China was officially
introduced in 1988. A bankrupted firm may later remerge as partially privatized; IPO
tends to diversify a firm’s ownership and also change its ownership concentration;
shareholding here refers to employee shareholding; during the reform era, a SOE can also
be sold directly to other SOEs, private owners, or employees; Leasing often takes the
form of granting a legal entity to rent buildings, land, or equipments from SOEs. The
lessee can be either insiders or outsiders; Joint venture refers to a venture jointly set up by
a domestic and a foreign firms. During the surveyed period, the foreign partner was not
allowed to obtain controlling shares in a joint venture.
Privatization
A firm is defined as private if the percentage of private-owned shares in this firm

6

collectively exceeds 50 percent. Otherwise, this firm will be regarded as remained SOE in
this study.
Corporate Governance Problems Shared by SOEs and Private Firms
Unlike other former transition countries, firms in China, SOEs and the private all
alike, may be subject to soft budget constraint and social burdens. Soft budget constraint
occurs if a firm continues to receive bank loans in the current period but has been losing
money in the previous period. Although soft budget constraint has been widely regarded
as a unique attrition of state-owned firms, it may appear in a private Chinese firm when
the owner of the firm has access to corrupted bank officials.
Social burden is defined as the sum of retirees and xiagang workers (workers no
longer actively working but still receiving minimum benefits from the firm). Unlike
privatization in other countries, privatized firms in China may be continuously obligated
to support welfare payments to retirees and xiagang workers upon requests from local
officials. Such provisions are often included before privatization takes place. To do so,
the local government attempts to avoid social unrest caused by layoffs post privatization.
In addition, all firms, regardless of ownership, may face the challenges of how to
affectively motivate managers and how to deal with excessive debts. These problems may
be more severe and persistent at SOEs. Nevertheless, private firms in China inevitably are
not immune to these problems.
Without fully considering these unique challenges shared by SOEs and the private
in China, the estimated results of the impact of privatization and restructurings on firms’
productivity and efficiency may be overstated.

7

Productivity and Efficiency of Chinese Firms
Productivity and its Measurement
Fried, Lovell and Schmidt (2008) define productivity as the ratio of a firm’s
output to its input. It indicates how much output(s) a firm can produce for a given amount
of input(s). To measure productivity, multifactor productivity (or total factor productivity)
is considered. Unlike other commonly estimated partial productivity variables, such as
labor productivity, multifactor productivity intends to capture the effects in total output
which are not caused by inputs. One of the interests of this study centers on the causes of
variation in productivity across sampled firms and through time.
Efficiency and its Measurement
Efficiency refers to the distance between observed and optimal values of a firm’s
output and input. That is, a firm’s efficiency can be measured by “…comparing its
observed output to maximum potential output obtainable from the input…” (Fried,
Lovell, and Schmidt (2008), pp. 8). Efficiency can be technical or allocative. If the
optimum is valued at the production possibility of a firm, then this efficiency is called
technical efficiency whereas if the optimum is valued at financial performance possibility,
this efficiency is considered as allocative. Given the limitation of our dataset 2, examining
the impacts of Chinese enterprise reforms on firms’ technical efficiency, and
subsequently, also on the causes of technical efficiency in general becomes an interest of
this study.

8

Empirical Strategies to Estimate Impacts of Enterprise Reform in China
To estimate the effects of privatization and restructuring on firms’ productivity
and efficiency, two different empirical approaches are adopted. An Instrumental Variable
General Moment Method (IV-GMM) is used to estimate the impact of enterprise reform
on firms’ productivity. A two-stage random-effects stochastic frontier model (2S-RESFA) is estimated to investigate the impact of enterprise reform on firms’ technical
efficiency.
The main reason of taking two dramatically different approaches in this study lies
on the fundamental difference in the nature of these two issues. Empirical studies on
productivity growth normally only requires a linear production function. Thus, the
estimation of productivity is essentially to retrieve the residual in a linear model without
distribution assumptions. However, empirical works on technical efficiency may not be
that straightforward. Recent literature of technical efficiency focuses on modeling a
firm’s efficiency with a one-sided distribution. As a result, the model has to take a form
of non-linear setup. To estimate such models and address endogeneity problem at the
same time requires a researcher to carry out a two-step estimation.
The reminder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter II provides a brief
historical background of enterprise reforms in China with an emphasis on the progress of
privatization. In addition, Chapter II also reviews the theoretical and empirical literature
on restructuring and privatization at Chinese SOEs. Chapter III describes the data set used
in this study and presents some preliminary analysis on the choices of various reform
2

Estimating a firm’s allocative efficiency requires information on input prices.
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strategies. A comprehensive description of the data can also be found in Chapter III.
Chapter IV estimates the impacts of restructuring and privatization on variation in
Chinese manufacturing productivity. Chapter V illustrates a two-stage random-effects
stochastic frontier analysis on Chinese manufacturing technical efficiency and examines
how privatization, hardening soft-budget constraint and easing social burdens affect
firms’ technical efficiency. Chapter VI concludes the study, point out limitations of the
current research approaches and offer possible improvements.

10

CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF CHINESE ENTERPRISE REFORM
AND LITERATURE REVIEW

History of Chinese Enterprise Reform
While the reform of SOEs in China began in 1978, a considerable amount of
privatization of small and medium size SOEs did not take hold until middle of the1990s.
Unlike the massive privatization which occurred in Eastern European countries, China
initially took a comparatively slow and gradual approach to proceed with privatization.
The initial goal of the Chinese government in privatizing some SOEs was to improve the
efficiency of those firms rather than to reduce the influence of the government on firm
operations. However, later on, as the privatization process picked up speed gradually and
apparently, the central government also showed strong support for privatization in certain
industrial sectors and for certain size firms. This reconstruction of SOEs’ ownership is
not only open to domestic private firms but also to qualified foreign firms allowing them
to buy a certain percentage of the shares of SOEs. The trend of this privatization process
is clearer by viewing Table 2. In 1995, only 3.52 percent of firms in the sample had been
privatized. However, in 2001, over 20 percent of firms had been privatized.
The Chinese privatization process can be viewed as unfolding in three stages. The
first stage began in the early 1980s. That was the period when China started to
experiment with a new economic system in which a non-state sector was created to
coexist with the state sector. The new non-state sector, though very small, indeed
manifested the benefits of privatization, such as quick response to the change of the
11

market and more efficient operation. However, the success of the newly created
privatized firms did not lead to a broader scale of privatization in the economy. The
second stage began in the early 1990s. The Chinese government launched a series of
measures to reform the SOEs. The industrial reform measures in this stage tried to inject a
system of managerial incentives to improve enterprise efficiency without altering the
state’s dominance in ownership of enterprises. Li (1997) shows that by injecting
incentives and decentralizing the economic decision-making process, the total factor
productivity was improved dramatically. The third stage began in mid 1990s. That was
when the Chinese government implemented an aggressive privatization program guided
by a policy called “retain the large, release the small”, which is to retain only 500 or so
largest SOEs and privatize the rest. However, even though the scale of this privatization
program is remarkable, the Chinese government did not actually “release the small” but
rather retained substantial influence on these privatized firms. Megginson and Netter
(2001) and Lin (2000) point out that for most of the so-called “privatized” firms, the
government is still the biggest share-holder, and that less than one-third of the shares of
those firms are sold to private investors. In addition, the goal of this stage (stage three) is
not only to improve the efficiency of SOEs but also to develop the security market in
China. Thus, the effect of this privatization effort is still unclear and is the central interest
of this study.
Literature Review
Privatization has been widely used by governments in the world today to resolve
the impending failure or improve the performance of SOEs. Megginson and Netter (2001)
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and Djankov and Murrell (2002) provide comprehensive surveys on the current
development of theoretical and empirical studies on privatization. Their work focuses
more on the privatization that took place in the “transition economies”. 3
Theoretical Literature on Privatization
The economic theory of privatization could be categorized into two branches: The
Public Interest Theory and the Principal-Agent Theory4. Public interest theories
emphasize the effectiveness of SOEs to solve market failure caused by private firms in an
unregulated oligopoly market. In contrast, Principal-Agent theories tend to address
productive inefficiency of SOEs arising from asymmetric information.
Public Interest theories state that “Political intervention can help when markets
fail, provided that the cure does not cost more than the disease”. 5 In other words, a SOE
may be better than a private firm in improving social welfare by allocating resources
more efficiently. Public ownership leads an SOE to take account of not only profit but
also consumer surplus that a private firm is inclined to ignore. Therefore, in a natural
monopoly market, private ownership would be biased toward setting a higher price. As a
consequence, the gain of social welfare from cost reduction might be offset by the loss
caused by market failure. Willner (2003) proposes a theoretical model which starts with a
monopolistic public firm. This public firm maximizes a social welfare function. To
compare the change in social welfare under a private firm setting, he also considers the
case that the public firm is replaced by an n-firm Cournot oligopoly. The comparison of

3

formerly socialist countries or communist countries undertaking economic reforms
See Vickers and Yarrow (1988)
5
See Willner (2003), page 61.
4
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the social welfare under different types of ownership shows that public ownership doesn’t
necessarily imply inefficiency. Actually, private ownership might led to social welfare
improvement over public ownership only when the cost reduction it induces exceeds a
certain threshold. In addition, Shapiro and Willig (1990) and Vickers and Yarrow (1988)
also investigate the advantages of public ownership over private ownership.
The Principal-Agent theories, on the other hand, weight more on the SOE’s
internal inefficiency which is primarily caused by asymmetric information between the
residual claimant and the manager of the firm. It argues that the principal-agent problem
can’t be sovled without transferring public ownership to private owners, as SOEs are
unable to eliminate this internal inefficiency by themselves. On the contrary, with the
introduction of certain regulations, the merits of private firms may persist and social
welfare would be improved after privatization. Principal-Agent theories can be classified
into two complementary approaches which differ by modeling who plays the role of the
agent, a politician or a manager.
The Principal-Agent theory with a politician being the agent stresses the
interference from the politician. SOE may be used to fulfill some personal objectives of
that politician, for example, over-employment and election wins rather than social welfare
maximization. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Boycko et al. (1996) develop a principalagent model with three players: treasury, politician and manager. In their model, the
treasury is concerned with profit and controls cash flow; the politician responds to voters’
needs (more jobs available) and is able to help the SOE get subsidies; the manager
maximizes profits and bribes politicians in the hope of receiving more subsidies from the
state but carrying less burden of the cost of employment. Since the treasury doesn’t have
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full information on the firm’s profit, the politician can help the manager to conceal profit
and ask for more subsidies in exchange for more employment. Thus, inefficiency of the
SOE occurs because of asymmetric information and that the transfer of information is
costly. Arin and Okten (2003) adopt similar model to examine the effects of privatization
on firm’s efficiency and disparities in technology adoption between public and private
firms. They show that privatization reduces unit cost and that public firms prefer to
maintain labor-intensive technology.
Differing from the politician theory, the Principal-Agent with manager theory
considers a typical principal-agent problem which only involves state (principal) and
manager (agent). In this type of model, the state is the residual claimant and determines
the reward to be given to the manager. However, the state is poorly informed about the
firm’s performance. The manager, on the other hand, decides how hard he (or she) wants
to work and has full knowledge of how well the firm is doing. Vickers and Yarrow (1988)
first explore this scheme of the principal-agent problem. Bös and Peters (1991) add
uncertainty and external control into the model. They find that the SOE would be
competitive in terms of cost reduction only when the state of the economy is good.
With regard to theoretical analysis of Chinese enterprise reform and
privatization, there are very few studies in the literature. Zhang (1997) models the effects
of reform on the performance of a Chinese SOE. He finds that shifting decision rights and
residual claims from the state to the manager and hardening budget constraints can
motivate the manager to work hard and thus lead to better performance. He concludes that
further improvement of efficiency will depend on privatization of the state enterprises.

15

Empirical Literature on Privatization
Regarding the effect of privatization in transition economies, Brown et al. (2006)
presents the most comprehensive empirical analysis of the effects of privatization on the
firms’ productivity in four former communist countries, Russia, Ukraine, Romania and
Hungary. They take into account the firm-specific effect and firm-specific time trend
effect. They conclude that while the effects of privatization differ in magnitudes across
these four nations, the results are robust in that privatization significantly increases
productivity in all nations. Moreover, they also find that firms privatized by foreign
investors achieve more sustainable growth in productivity than those privatized by
domestic investors. Our study applies their methodologies to a Chinese dataset.
Comparison of the results from this study and theirs may shed light on how the effects of
privatization differ across countries adopting different transition strategies.
Turning to the empirical literature on privatization reform in China, Jefferson
and Singh (1999) offer a comprehensive review of industrial SOEs’ reform and
privatization process in China. Cao (2000) provides a chronology of Chinese privatization
since 1978. She also evaluates the consequences of the reform policies that China had
adopted during the ownership transition of SOEs. Lin et al. (1998) discuss several issues
associated with the managerial and ownership reform of China’s SOEs. They conclude
that without the easing of policy burdens and the removal of the soft budget constraint,
there is little prospect for SOEs to achieve better performance. Dong and Putterman
(2003) study the effect of hardening the budget constraint on the redundant labor problem
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in Chinese SOEs and find that unlike in developed economies 6, hardening budget
constraint in China only results in an increase in redundant labor if the firms’ social
burdens are not lessened.
Jefferson and Su (2006), Xu et al. (2005) and Song and Yao (2006) also study the
effects of Chinese privatization on firm performance. Using a large panel data of Chinese
SOEs, Jefferson and Su (2005) find that a larger non-state share improves the
performance of firms. However, the lack of share structure information in their data limits
the reliability of their conclusions. Analyzing a national survey of the ownership reform
of industrial SOEs in China, Xu et al. (2005) reach several interesting conclusions. In
particular, they find that the success of reform positively correlates with reduced political
control affording the firms more flexibility in labor deployment. Song and Yao (2004)
use the same dataset as being used here to address the effects of privatization on firm
performance. Nonetheless, this study differs from theirs in two ways. First, in addition to
controlling the firm-specific effect as they did, this study also considers the firm-specific
time trend. Second, they did not distinguish the effects of privatization associated with
different types of private ownership whereas this study does.
Finally, Dong et al. (2002) study the impacts of share ownership reform on
employee attitudes in China’s privatized rural industries. Qi and Zhang (2000) use firm
data from the Chinese stock market to address how changes in the shareholding structure
can affect the performance of stock exchange listed companies.

6

They compare the SOEs’ reform in Italian to that in China.
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CHAPTER III
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
The data used in this paper comes from a survey conducted in 2002 by
International Finance Corporation and National Bureau of Statistics on 863 firms in 11
cities. It provides information from 1995 to 2001 on ownership structure, accounting,
employment and corporation governance. 7 The selection of these cities is not random.
Harbin, Fushun, Tangshan, Lanzhou and Chengdu used to be the heart of traditional
manufacturing of Chinese economy during the planned economy era. Most of the
residents in those cities were employed by medium or large SOEs. As result, these cities
suffered the most, with the shutdown of many SOEs as the reform of local SOEs
progressed. Profitability and employment of SOEs in these cities had decreased
considerably in 1990s. Xining and Guiyang are located in more remote and less
developed areas. However, due to their unique geographical and strategic location, they
had been chosen as sites for some large military SOEs. Therefore, the presence of SOEs
in these two cities is also significant. Weifang, Zhenjiang, Huangshi, and Hengyang are
cities in coastal regions of China. The less important roles that these cities played during
the centrally planned-economy era allow these cities to embrace the economic reform and
privatization more enthusiastically.

7

These 11 cities include Harbin, Fushun, Tangshan, Xining, Lanzhou, Chengdu, Guiyang, Weifang, Zhenjiang,
Huangshi and Henyang.
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Privatization
As shown in the survey, the landscape of Chinese firms’ ownership structure has
shifted dramatically from 1995 to 2001. Figure 2 summarizes the percentages of private
firms over all observations in the sample in different locations from 1995 to 2001. Prior
to 1997, northern and western provinces were leaders in the share of private firms
although on average the weight of private ownership was merely around 4 percent in all
areas. As of 1997, 7 percent and 5.71 percent of firms in the North and the West were
privately owned, respectively.
In contrast, there was almost no presence of private firms in the East in the sample
from 1995 to 1997. This weak presence of private firms during this period, though
contrary to the overall “open-up” economic policy since 1980s, can still be explained.
The Chinese communist party did not formally endorse privatization until the launch of
the Ninth Five-Year Plan in 1996. Before 1996, the emphasis was not on privatizing but
on reviving SOEs by way of measures such as granting legal status to firms, allowing
more autonomy, and providing incentives to managers.
However, by then the government realized that it is very costly to keep the lossmaking SOEs after a series of reforms on input prices, market entry, employment
contracts, and bank lending rules. The resulting solution is to introduce a policy called
“grasp the big and let go of the small” in the mid-90s. According to this policy, the
central government would only preserve 500 key SOEs and the rest would be let go
ultimately. The impact of this policy on the share structure of Chinese SOEs can be
readily seen. Figure 2 shows that privatization of SOEs has accelerated rapidly since then.
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By 2001, the ending period of the survey, overall, the share of private firms has increased
to almost 19 percent. Moreover, different areas exhibit different pace of privatization.
Notably, the share of private firms had reached 30 percent in the East coastal regions by
2001. The inland regions were lagging behind with only 10.37 percent of firms owned
privately. This finding is echoed by the disparities of reform process across China. As the
engine of China’s economic growth, the eastern region has been more aggressive in terms
of adopting and implementing radical reforms.
The summary statistics of the ownership changes are displayed in Table 1. Among
the privatized SOEs, Table 1 shows that 97 percent are privatized by domestic investors.
These investors may include top and middle managers, ordinary employees, domestic
private firms, or legal persons (entities). In contrast, foreign investors are still facing strict
limitation from participating in the Chinese SOE privatization process. In 2001, the
percentage of firms owned by foreign investors even declined to 0.52 percent. In addition,
the percentage of firms privatized by insiders has surged from 0.29 percent in 1995 to 13
percent in 2001. Insiders may include managers from various levels and ordinary
employees (the rank and files). On the other hand, privatization initiated by outsiders,
who may include legal persons, domestic private firms, and foreign firms, has moderately
increased from 3 to 8 percents during the sample period. It seems that domestic and
insider privatizations have gained more popularity among SOEs as paths toward
privatization.
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Table 1. Ownership Distributions in the Sample (in Percentage), from 1995 to 2001
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Domestic
2.64
2.84
3.4
6.76
9.49
14.97
20.21
Foreign
0.88
0.57
0.57
0.56
0.81
0.8
0.52
Insider
Outsider

0.29
3.23

0.57
2.84

1.13
2.83

2.54
4.79

4.07
6.23

9.09
6.68

12.86
7.87

Note: This table shows the ownership distribution in the sample data. All values are in percentage.
Domestic refers to firms privatized by domestic private owners; foreign stands for firms privatized
by foreign investors; insider refers to firms owned by their own employees and managers; outsider
refers to firms whose majority shares are sold to outside investors.

Besides the significant increase in the number of private firms in the survey, the
increasing importance of private sector in the whole economy after 1997 can also be seen
in other indicators. Figure 3 shows that the share of gross revenue generated by SOEs had
declined from 96 percent in 1995 to 77 percent, whereas the share of private firms had
increased from 4 percent to 23 percent during the same period. Likewise, the share of
gross value of output from SOEs (Figure 4) had dropped from 95 percent in 1995 to 74
percent in 2001, whereas that of private firms had climbed from 5 percent to 26 percent.
On the labor market front, private firms also had employed more workers since 1997.
Figure 5 reports that private firms employed 24 percent of labor force in 2001, compared
to only 5 percent in 1995.
To examine to what extent our sampled data reflect the changes of ownership
nationwide, we compared shares of gross value of output by different ownerships from
the national data to those from the sampled data. The national data are plotted in Figure 5
and the data are available at National Bureau of Statistics of China. The national data
indicate that gross value of output produced by SOEs had declined from over 70 percent
in 1995 to 60 percent in 2001 whereas shares of private firms have risen from less than 30
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percent to almost 40 percent from 1995 to 2001. Comparing with our sample data in
Figure 4, one can conclude that private firms are slightly unrepresented in our sample.
To conclude, privatization has progressed rapidly after receiving approvals from
the policymakers and yet SOEs were still the dominant force in China with respect to
overall economic importance during the period covered by the survey.

Note: Overall is the percentage of number of private firms among all observations. East includes cities of
Weifang and Zhenjiang; West includes cities of Lanzhou, Xining, Guiyang and Chengdu; North includes
cities of Harbin, Fushun, and Tangshan; and South includes Huangshi and Hengyang.

Figure 2. Changes of Ownership, 1995-2001
Restructuring
Chinese central government has always preferred to improve SOEs productive
efficiency without further compromising state controls in SOEs. As a result, before
privatization was officially endorsed, most of Chinese SOEs had gone through a variety
of restructurings. Most of the restructurings are aimed at clarifying or reallocating
property rights over firms’ assets and liabilities. Garnaut et al. (2005) identify seven
major forms of restructuring in China. These restructuring efforts include initial public
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offering (IPO), internal restructuring, bankruptcy, employee shareholding, open sales,
leasing and joint venture.

Note: SOE is the total revenue of State-Owned Enterprises divided by that of all observations in the sample
and Private is computed as the total revenue of private firms divided by that of all observations.

Figure 3. Revenue Shares by Ownership, 1995-2001

Note: SOE is the total value-added of State-Owned Enterprises divided by that of all observations and
private is computed as the total value-added of private firms divided by that of all observations in the
sample.

Figure 4. Shares of Gross Output by Ownership, 1995-2001
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Note: Shares of SOE employment is obtained by dividing the number of working employees at SOEs with
total number of working employees in all observations. Shares of private employment is obtained by
dividing the number of working employees at private firms with that in all observations.

Figure 5. Changes of Employment Shares by Ownerships, 1995-2001

Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China

Figure 6. Shares of Gross Output by Ownership, 1995-2001 (National Data)
If a firm chooses to take IPO, employee shareholding, open sales or joint venture,
it may become private-owned at the end. Thus, we will only consider internal
restructuring, bankruptcy and leasing as non-ownership-change reforms in this study.
Internal restructuring refers to incorporation in the context of Chinese SOE reform. This
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reform does not change the ownership of a firm, but forces it to verify its legal ownership.
During years of reform, SOEs are required to convert themselves into either limited
liability companies (small SOEs) or limited liability shareholding companies (large
SOEs). After Bankruptcy Law came into effect in 1988, Chinese SOEs are now allowed
to file for bankruptcy. As Garnaut et al. (2005) show, bankruptcy policy has been widely
abused by poorly performing SOEs as a tool to evade debt payments. When an investor
cannot afford to privatize a SOE, he (she) would most likely choose to lease the SOE.
Leasing does not change a firm’s ownership, but it often gives the management or the
lease holder more autonomy to operate the business.
Table 2 presents the percentage of firms in the sample that have at least taken one
form of restructuring. Within the sample, some firms have undergone more than one
round of restructuring. However, to identify the effects of different restructuring on firms’
productivity growth, this study only considers the first round of reform that a firm ever
took. Table 2 shows that the restructuring process has also gained momentum after 1995.
There were only 1.47 percent of the sampled firms ever undertaking a restructuring in
1995 whereas 61.34 percent of firms have taken at least one round of restructuring by the
end of 2001. Among all non-ownership-change restructuring policies, internal
restructuring is the most popular one. By the end of 2001, 32.44 percent of SOEs have
been incorporated. Bankruptcy and leasing appear equally attractive as reforms proceed.
12.89 and 16.01 percents of SOEs have chosen bankruptcy or leasing respectively by the
end of 2001. However, leasing has become more appealing to SOEs than bankruptcy after
1997.
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Table 2. Non-Ownership-Change Restructuring Distributions (in Percentage),
from 1995 to 2001
1995
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Reform total
1.47
5.11 7.36 8.45 12.2 12.84 13.91 61.34
Internal restructuring
Bankruptcy
Lease

0.88

1.7

3.68

5.35

7.05

7.22

6.56 32.44

0

2.27

2.55

1.41

1.63

2.14

2.89 12.89

0.59

1.14

1.13

1.69

3.52

3.48

4.46 16.01

Note: This table shows the non-ownership-change reform distributions in the sample from 1995 to 2001. Reform
total indicates the percentage of sampled firms that have undergone a non-ownership-change restructuring. All
values are in percentages.

Selected Performance Indicators and Production Factors
The gross value of total output, unit cost and profitability are chosen to measure
performance changes of Chinese SOEs during the sample periods. The gross value of
total output is adjusted for inflation with 1995 price index as the base year. Unit cost is
considered in order to capture the effort exerted by the managers on cost reduction. It is
reflected by the percentage of managerial and operational costs over total value of output.
Profitability is defined as return to assets which is the percentage of the pre-tax profit
over the total value of assets. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics (mean and
standard deviation) of these performance indicators over the period of 1995 to 2001. It is
notable that the average gross value of total output for sampled firms has increased from
29 to 38 million Chinese Yuan. However, there is no sign indicating any improvements on
the average profitability among the sampled firms. It shows that on average firms have
faced negative return to asset from 1995 to 2001. Such negative profitability may be
attributed to the ever-increasing competition in the market. Lastly, the trend of changes in
average unit cost is rather mixed.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Performance in the Sample
Year
Output
Unit Cost
Profitability
1995
29.08
1.43
-0.05
(43.78)
(2.85)
(0.12)
1996
31.44
1.35
-0.06
(46.25)
(0.87)
(0.08)
1997
32.03
1.99
-0.06
(51.50)
(6.32)
(0.08)
1998
31.38
2.02
-0.07
(49.33)
(4.08)
(0.09)
1999
33.22
4.31
-0.06
(56.11)
(40.37)
(0.08)
2000
32.32
2.18
-0.06
(52.39)
(6.03)
(0.11)
2001
37.84
3.25
-0.06
(37.84)
(18.06)
(0.10)
Average
426
390
396
Sample Size

Note: Sample size is expressed in the unit of the number of firms. Output equals the value of gross output
and is measured in Chinese currency (unit: million Yuan). It is adjusted by the ex-factory price indices of
industrial products (year 1995 is chosen as the base year). Unit cost is the ratio of operation cost (total sales
minus pretax profit) over total sales. Profitability is measured by the ratio of pretax profit over total asset.
Standard Deviations are shown in the parenthesis.

Plagued by principal-agent problem, soft-budget constraint, and social welfare
obligations, SOEs are often accused of lacking of efficiency. To examine this common
conception in the context of Chinese firms, several performance indicators are selected
and compared across different ownerships and time periods. First, private firms generally
had outperformed SOEs in terms of value added per employee (Table 4). Value added per
employee at private firms on average was 0.97 compared to 0.59 at SOEs and 0.60 for all
firms in 1995. This indicater peaked in 2000 for private firms at 1.17; however it was
only 0.82 for SOEs and 0.88 for all firms.
Second, standard deviations of value added per employee at SOEs were larger
than those at private firms before 1999 and generally lower thereafter. This may reflect
the effects of the “grasping the big and letting go of the small” policy; small and money-
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losing SOEs were likely to be sold to private or foreign investors as privatization
accelerated after 1998. The remaining SOEs are more homogeneous as judged by their
performance.
Third, the Chinese firms’ average performance as measured by value added per
employee had improved consistently from 0.60 in 1995 to 0.91 in 2001. Lastly, a close
examination of Table 4 suggests that all firms’ performance dipped in 1996 and soon
recovered in the following year. This sudden decrease may largely attribute to the
worsened macroeconomic environment in 1997 caused by the hardened credit
environment when the government tried to tame inflation in the mid-1990s.
Table 4. Value Added per Employee by All, State-Owned, and Private Firms, 1995-2001
Ownership
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Mean
0.60
0.53
0.57
0.65
0.71
0.88
0.91
All
Stdv.
0.64
0.61
0.75
0.91
0.91
1.16
1.40
Median
0.47
0.40
0.41
0.44
0.51
0.62
0.57

SOE

Mean
Stdv.
Median

0.59
0.65
0.45

0.52
0.61
0.39

0.56
0.75
0.41

0.64
0.93
0.43

0.66
0.90
0.49

0.82
1.12
0.58

0.88
1.45
0.51

Private

Mean
Stdv.
Median

0.97
0.53
0.98

0.79
0.51
0.67

0.85
0.74
0.63

0.75
0.65
0.66

1.11
0.92
0.85

1.17
1.33
0.73

1.07
1.20
0.77

Note: All refers to all observations; SOE refers to firms whose majority shares are owned by the state or
other SOEs; Private refers to firms whose majority shares are owned by private investor, private firms or
foreign entities. Value added is in unit of 10,000 yuan and adjusted with 1978-1980 price level as base year.
Total number of working employees is used as total number of employees in the computation.

SOEs in China are more likely to focus on capital-intensive industries than private
enterprises. Table 5 shows that total assets per employee at SOEs are consistently larger
than those at private firms. This difference can be explained by the large entry barriers

28

blocking private firms from competing in heavy industries and the discrimination against
private firms in banks’ lending practice. The high entry barriers for heavy industries are
mostly caused by the government economic policies. Political interventions are often
cited as to why the state-owned banks are reluctant to lend money to private firms (Yusuf,
Nabeshima and Perkins (2006) pp. 73). Table 5 also indicates that total assets per
employee at SOE had increased continuously from 1995 to 2001. The absence of the
similar trend in private firms suggests two explanations. First, a large scale of lay-off had
occurred at most SOEs from 1995 to 2001. Second, the government had continued to
favor the retained large SOEs by directing more investments to them. Finally, standard
deviations of total assets per employee also show that the disparity of the size of SOEs
had widened during this period. This finding reinforces the policy of retaining big and
letting go of small SOEs.
Also shown in Table 6, from 1995 to 2001, total employment at all firms had
continuously decreased, particularly at SOEs. The mean of the number of working
employees 8 at SOEs had decreased by 47 percent compared to only 34 percent at private
firms and 42 percent overall from 1995 to 2001 in the sample. Private firms on average
employed more workers than SOEs, partly due to the fact that most private firms operate
in labor intensive industries. In addition, as SOEs consistently shed off working
employees, private firms only started labor downsizing after 1998 and maintained a stable
workforce before 1998. This decrease in private workforce may be caused by
restructuring at private sector after 1997 financial crisis.

8
During the restructuring at Chinese SOEs, reducing excessive employment had been a sensitive and complicated issue.
Normally, current employees at a SOE were either retained or let go and became redundant workers. The retained workers
would continue to work with full compensation. They are thus named “working employees” in this paper. The redundant
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Table 5. Total Assets per Employee of All, SOE, and Private Firms, 1995-2001
Ownership
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Mean
4.82
5.27
6.11
9.41
12.34
14.40
18.20
All
Stdv.
6.87
5.54
7.27
22.75
30.08
33.20
46.12
Median 3.51
3.95
4.33
5.07
6.00
6.51
6.61

SOE

Mean
Stdv.
Median

4.83
6.98
3.50

5.31
5.62
3.99

6.21
7.39
4.37

9.77
23.56
5.15

13.08
31.54
6.14

15.89
35.71
6.82

21.07
50.68
7.18

Private

Mean
Stdv.
Median

4.56
2.95
3.75

3.98
2.27
3.43

3.72
2.12
2.77

4.73
3.12
3.79

5.39
2.77
4.44

5.79
4.28
4.87

5.69
4.03
4.31

Note: All refers to all observations; SOE refers to firms whose majority shares are owned by the state or
other SOEs; Private refers to firms whose majority shares are owned by private investor, private firms or
foreign entities. Total asset is in unit of 10,000 yuan and adjusted with 1978-1980 price level as base year.
Total number of working employees is used as total number of employees in the computation.

Table 6. Working Employees of All, SOE, and Private Firms, 1995-2001
Ownership
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Mean
705
678
628
527
492
443
406
All
Stdv.
751
704
657
568
539
511
487
Total 213,530 218,243 205,307 183,320 180,039 167,893 158,618

SOE

Mean
Stdv.
Total

Private

Mean
Stdv.
Total

698
670
619
510
471
409
367
747
695
640
532
506
471
440
203,896 208,520 194,467 164,644 155,952 132,184 116,699
876
879
9,634

884
949
9,723

834
985
10,840

747
901
18,676

688
767
24,087

638
672
35,709

574
629
41,919

Note: All refers to all observations; SOE refers to firms whose majority shares are owned by the state or
other SOEs; Private refers to firms whose majority shares are owned by private investor, private firms or
foreign entities.

workers include workers who chose to take early retirement, whose position were eliminated during the reform but continue to
maintain a nominal tie with the company, and workers who lost their jobs and were no longer affiliated with the company.
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Determinants of Privatization and Selection Bias
Causes for privatization in China have been more than a simple matter. The
decision to privatize has been highly influenced by government policies. Several
determinants have been argued and documented in previous literature. First, betterperforming SOEs are more likely to be privatized because initial success from privatizing
these types of SOEs may help the government to attract future private investors and find
supports for further reform efforts ( Su and Jefferson (2003)). Evidence from Table 7 is
consistent with this determinant of privatization. On average, the return of assets for firms
that have never been privatized is -0.016, which is much lower than 0.019 achieved by
privatized SOEs during their pre-privatization period. Privatized SOEs also have lower
debt of asset ratio prior to privatization compared to SOEs that have never been
privatized. In addition, companies generating higher tax revenues are more favored in the
privatization process. As Table 7 shows, the ratio of tax over total asset at privatized
SOEs during the pre-privatization period is 0.038 and higher than 0.024 of neverprivatized SOEs. Second, to prevent social unrest caused by massive layoff that usually
occurs following privatization, Chinese government tries to privatize SOEs with smaller
size of employment and assets. Table 7 shows that the average number of employment at
privatized SOEs is 720 whereas those remained SOEs employ 848 workers on average.
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Table 7. Summary Statistics of Never-Privatized SOEs and Privatized Firms before Privatization
Central Provincial
City
County
Overdue
Total
Total
shares
shares
shares
shares
ROA
DAR
Tax
tax
employment
assets
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Never
privatized
SOEs
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Preprivatizatio
n SOEs

-0.016 0.821
0.024
(0.111) (0.488) (0.033)

0.024
(0.033)

847.645
(877.000)

3055.851
(3421.338)

0.850
(8.890)

1.590
(12.512)

78.174
(40.765)

12.434
(32.627)

0.019
0.776
0.038
(0.101) (0.261) (0.034)

0.020
(0.032)

719.592
(485.179)

2135.177
(1572.254)

0
---

0
---

79.562
(40.473)

11.189
(31.043)

Note: The reported results are means and standard deviations (in parenthesis). Never privatized SOEs are SOEs that have never been privatized in the sample;
Pre-privatization SOEs refers to the pre-privatization periods of SOEs that have been privatized during the observation period. ROA is return of assets. DAR
is debt asset ratio, and Tax is the ratio of total tax and total assets. Total employment includes working employees, retirees, and Xiagang employees. Total
assets are in unit of Yuan and adjusted for price changes. Central shares, provincial, city and county shares are the percentages of shares owned by the central,
provincial, city and county governments, respectively.

Moreover, the remained SOEs own 43 percent more assets than their counterparts which
are later privatized. Third, firms largely controlled by local governments are more likely
to be targets of privatization. Guo and Yao (2005) attribute this phenomenon to the
financial constraint faced by local governments (city and county levels) after the central
government hardened local SOEs’ credit lines at state-owned banks. However, in this
sample there is no significant difference in shares owned by local governments between
privatized SOEs and never-privatized SOEs. The absence of such a difference may reflect
how this survey was administrated. It seems that local government controlled SOEs were
more likely to be chosen to participate in this survey. Nonetheless, none of the later-on
privatized SOEs in the sample have shares from the central or provincial governments. In
contrast, firms that remained state-owned do have on average 2.5 percent shares owned
by the central and provincial governments.
Determinants of Productivity and Efficiency
To understand determinants of Chinese firms’ productivity and efficiency,
correlations between selected performance indicators and factors that may affect firms’
productivity and efficiency are presented in Table 8. The selected performance indicators
include value added per employee, revenue per employee, return of asset (ROA), and
total factor productivity (TFP). Value added per employee and revenue per employee are
derived from dividing total value added and value of gross output over total number of
working employees. TFP is the retained residual from estimating a fixed-effects CobbDouglas production function. The dependent variable is the value of gross output and
independent variables include number of working employees and value of total asset. The
33

determinants of inefficiency include shares owned by the state, shares owned by
managers, redundant worker, and government subsidies. To facilitate computation of
correlation coefficients, shares of state are chosen as a proxy for ownership and are
expected to be negatively correlated with a firm’s performance. Manager shares are
chosen to capture effects of management incentive and autonomy on firms’ performance.
Government subsidies are used to measure the extent of soft budget constraint. It is
postulated by theory that the availability of subsidies may relieve firms from the pressure
of achieving higher efficiency. Figure 7 compares the degree of soft budget constraints at
SOEs and private firms. Two interesting observations can be drawn. First, both the SOEs
and reformed SOEs in the sample are still subject to soft budget constraint. Around 20
percent of SOEs reported receiving bank loans while losing money for all years except in
1998. Second, private firms in China also faced soft budget constraint although the
percent of such a private firm is smaller and trend is downward. Before 1999, there were
over 10 percent of private firms receiving loans while in red. Moreover, Figure 8 shows
the percentage of retirees and xiagang workers (workers no longer actively working but
still receiving minimum benefits from firms) over total number of employees at SOEs
and privatized firms. Unlike privatization in other countries, privatized firms in China are
continuously obligated to support welfare payments to retirees and xiagang workers even
after privatization took place. As of 2001, retirees and xiagang workers still accounted for
on average 40 percent of the total employment at privatized firms although this
percentage had decreased since 1998. On the contrary, the numbers of redundant workers
at SOEs and reformed SOEs had almost doubled from 1995 to 2001.

34

Table 8. Correlations of Firms’ Performance and Efficiency Determinants
State
Management
Redundant
Government
Performance Indicators
shares
shares
workers
subsidies
Value Added per
Employee
-0.136***
0.041*
-0.077***
0.034
Revenue per employee

-0.058***

0.019

0.283***

-0.003

Return on assets

-0.164***

0.096***

-0.093***

0.047

Total factor productivity

-0.144***

0.073***

-0.052**

-0.114**

Note: This table reports the correlation between selected performance indicators and efficiency
determinants. Total factor productivity (TFP) is derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function
regression in which inputs include number of working employees and total assets. *, **, *** indicate the
10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively.

Table 8 shows that state shares are negatively correlated with all performance
indicators with 1 percent significance level. Manager shares are found to be positively
correlated with ROA and TFP with 1 percent significance level. Redundant worker is
negatively correlated with all performance indicators except revenue per employee.
Moreover, government subsidies exhibit no significant correlation with all performance
indicators except TFP. TFP is negatively correlated with government subsidies with 5
percent significance level.
Lastly, Table 9 summarizes changes in privatized firms’ performance, sizes,
employment, and share structures 3 years before and 3 years after privatization. The
summary statistics shed some lights on both causes and effects of privatization. ROA had
seen a sudden increase in the year before privatization and it picked up quickly after an
initial dip in the first year of privatization. Debt asset ratio (DAR) exhibited a rather
steady increasing trend prior to privatization. This increase may imply that the
governments tried to transfer more debts to private owners before handing over the
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ownership. After the debt level peaked in the first year after privatization, it started to
drop continuously in the following two years.

Note: A firm is indentified as facing a soft budget constraint if it has lost money in the previous year and yet
still has outstanding overdue loans by the end of the current year. Data from 1995 are omitted because no
firm identified itself as facing a soft budget constraint in 1995.

Figure 7. Percentages of SOEs and Private Firms with Soft Budget Constraints,
1995-2001

Note: This graph shows the ratios of total number of retired and xiagang workers to the total number of
employees at SOEs and the privatized from 1995 to 2001. Xiagang refers to workers who are no longer
working but still receiving minimum benefits from firms.

Figure 8. Percentages of Retired and Xiagang Workers at SOEs and Privatized Firms,
1995-2001
Changes in total assets, numbers of working employees and total employment indicate
that the sizes of firms have increased after being privatized. In addition, employment also
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shows that firms normally shed off labor in the first three years before privatization.
Regarding share structure changes during pre and post privatization periods, one can find
that city governments tend to sell all of their shares in the privatized SOEs and yet county
governments may choose to retain a small percent of ownership in SOEs. To conclude,
performance of most firms seemed worsened in the first year after privatization; although
the improvements in SOEs’ performance after privatization were consistent, their
performance most likely just recovered to their pre-privatization level; the sizes of asset
value and employment all tended to increase after privatization.
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Table 9. Summary Statistics of Performance, Size, and Employment before and after Privatization
Performance
1-year
2-year
3-year
Indicators
3-year prior 2-year prior 1-year prior Privatization
after
after
after
Return of asset
0.026
0.025
0.038
0.020
0.035
0.036
(0.097)
(0.099)
(0.141)
(0.124)
(0.112)
(0.102)
Debt asset ratio
0.758
0.779
0.821
1.109
0.980
0.794
(0.247)
(0.248)
(0.309)
(1.444)
(1.210)
(0.389)
Tax
0.043
0.041
0.046
0.044
0.047
0.044
(0.031)
(0.031)
(0.052)
(0.045)
(0.042)
(0.032)
Overdue tax
0.025
0.028
0.025
0.027
0.031
0.031
(0.036)
(0.040)
(0.040)
(0.039)
(0.042)
(0.043)
Total asset
2167.290
2244.645
2151.005
2065.233
2272.021
2418.688
(1652.070) (1734.625) (1552.691)
(1557.111) (1731.757) (1808.107)
Total
employment
738.000
726.000
696.000
674.000
701.000
721.000
(536.000)
(534.000)
(518.000)
(532.000) (554.000) (580.000)
Working
employees
615.436
584.691
541.135
507.270
519.018
547.807
(511.746)
(510.603)
(480.034)
(497.510) (526.118) (564.985)
City shares
75.000
76.923
80.000
0
0
0
(43.667)
(42.544)
(40.584)
------County shares
20.549
18.433
13.486
0.162
0.218
0.194
(39.675)
(38.348)
(33.789)
(0.986)
(1.134)
(1.069)

Note: This table reports summary statistics of privatized firms’ performance indicators, size, and employment prior to and after privatization.
The reported figures are means and standard deviations (in parenthesis). Return of asset = net profit before tax/total asset; debt asset ratio = total
liability/total asset; tax = total tax/total asset; total asset is in unit of 10,000 yuan and adjusted for price change; tax and overdue tax are ratios
of total tax and amount of overdue tax over total assets, respectively. Total employment includes working employees, retirees, xiagang employees.
City and county shares are the shares owned by city and county governments.

CHAPTER IV
IMPACTS OF ENTERPRISE REFORMS ON CHINESE
MANUFACTURING PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
Introduction
While privatization has gained popularity as a remedy to aid failing state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) across the world, the process of privatization in China has always
been gradual and cautious. Such a gradualism approach is largely attributed to the fear
that the government may lose control of the country’s economy if SOEs are massively
privatized. Therefore, unlike reforms of SOEs undertaken in the former Soviet Union and
Eastern European blocks, Chinese government has taken a more comprehensive approach
to improve efficiencies at its SOEs. This approach includes ownership change, namely
privatization and reforms without relinquishing state controls. To shed light on the effects
of this hybrid restructuring strategy on Chinese firms’ efficiencies, this chapter uses a
Chinese firm-level panel data to examine the effects of privatization and non-ownership
restructurings on firm’s productivity in China. A study on privatization in China is
warranted given that most current literature has focused on the merits of privatization
process in Central and Eastern European countries where privatization has mostly yielded
significantly positive effects on firms’ performances. Moreover, a study on China’s SOE
restructuring may also add new evidence and insight to the existing body of literature on
firms’ efficiency in transition economies. Lastly, the effects of partial privatization or
reforms without compromising state controls, such as leasing and employee shareholding
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etc., on SOEs have not been extensively examined by researchers as much as the effect of
privatization.
The empirical research on Chinese SOE reform has faced several hurdles. First,
Chinese firm-level data with sufficient information on reform and ownership structures
has largely not been available. This data constraint is mainly caused by the policies
adopted by the Chinese government to privatize its SOEs. Even though the economic
reform started as early as 1980, the sale of SOEs was meagerly allowed until 1995.
Therefore, previous studies of Chinese privatization have been hindered either by too
short time period to be adequate for time series analysis or by too few numbers of
privatized SOEs to be adequate for cross sectional analysis. Utilizing a more recent
dataset with a longer time span and larger sample size of privatized SOEs, this study
should be able to ascertain the restructuring effects more reliably than previous studies.
Second, endogeneity problem has been well documented in most research on
Chinese privatization. The persistence of this problem may come from two sources. One
is selection bias due to the fact that Chinese SOEs have been deliberately selected by the
government for different restructuring strategies. Yao (2005) find that better-performing
SOEs are more likely to be chosen for privatization. Thus, when one attempts to examine
the impacts of SOEs restructuring on their efficiencies in China, the findings may not be
warranted as robust or reliable if the selection bias is not sufficiently addressed. Second,
the endogeneity problem may also arise when firms modify their production behavior in
anticipation of future ownership changes or restructuring. For example, firms may
attempt to be more productive if future privatization is anticipated. By doing so, they may
attract higher bids from private investors. If this “anticipation effect” does exist, then a
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general panel data treatment, such as a within or first-differenced estimator, may violate
the strictly exogenous condition for panel estimation. To address these two sources of
endogeneity, this chapter proposes a first-differenced instrumental variables general
method of moments (IV-GMM) approach. With this approach, the selection bias can be
controlled by introducing several exogenous instrumental variables (IVs) whereas the
violation of strictly exogenous condition in a panel setting can be eased by estimating a
first-differenced model with lagged value of the chosen IVs. Moreover, firms’
performances in the pre-privatization periods are later used to facilitate a specification
test to examine if the endogeneity problems have been effectively controlled with the IV
GMM estimation.
Third, an omitted variable problem may also arise if a firm’s current production
level is correlated with its manager’s or local government’s previous expectation of its
future ownership changes. For instance, if privatization is expected to occur in the future,
the managers may not only adjust the firm’s current production but also change the firms’
future production strategies accordingly. As a result, failing to consider the impacts of
managers’ current expectations of a firm’s future restructuring on its future production
may cause an omitted variable problem. By using the lagged values of instrumental
variables to estimate managers’ expectation of future ownership change this paper may
adequately address this omitted variable problem.
The focus of this chapter is to examine the effects of privatization and other
restructuring strategies on Chinese firms’ productivity growth. The empirical results show
that privatization may not yield significantly positive results on firms’ productivity
growth immediately but only until one year after privatization takes place. It is found that
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firms’ productivity growth may increase as much as 214 percent in the first year after
privatization. In addition, other reform measures also affect firms’ productivity growth
significantly and the effects of these reform measures appear to be more immediate than
those of privatization. Downsizing of the number of retired workers and excessive debt
are found to boost productivity growth, on average, by 37.3 and 5.2 percents respectively
in the same year of reform. Hardening budget constraint is found to only have marginal
impacts on firms’ productivity growth, but the effects are positive and significant.
Moreover, the effects of partial privatization on firms’ productivity growth are also
estimated. The results indicate that partial privatization induces no significant effects on
productivity growth. This may imply that introducing private ownership to SOEs cannot
improve firms’ efficiency unless private shares exceed the 50 percent threshold.
Furthermore, to investigate how various types of private ownerships affect productivity
growth in former SOEs, privatized firms are further disaggregated into insider and
outsider or domestic and foreign owned. Insider privatization shows significantly positive
effects on firms’ productivity growth; yet no significant changes are found for other forms
of privatization.
Lastly, this chapter also obtains some insights on the optimal sequencing for
restructuring. Without first taking step to harden soft-budget constraints properly and to
reduce excessive debts at SOEs, all restructuring attempts appear to be in vain. However,
leasing SOEs to managers or private investors seems to increase productivity growth by
55 percent on average if soft-budget constraint and excessive debt are eased.
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Endogeneity and Model Specifications
The Sources of Endogeneity
A typical estimation on impacts of privatization on firms’ productivity can be
specified as the following.
(4.1)

y it = β1l it + β 2 k it + β 3 privit + β w ' wit + β yr ' yearit + u i + ε it

Where y it is logarithm of the gross value of total output and lit and k it are the total
number of on-duty workers and total value of assets in logarithm, respectively. privit
stands for ownership dummy. It takes the value of 1 if the percentage of total private
shares in a firm exceeds 50 and equals 0 otherwise. wit is a vector which represents other
determinants of a firm’s efficiency in China. It includes managers’ incentive, degree of
social burden, degree of soft budget constraint, and excessive debt. Managers’ incentive
is measured by the percentage of total shares owned by top and middle managers; the
ratio of number of retirees to the total number of employees is used to measure social
burden; soft budget constraint is constructed as the ratio between the value of current
outstanding loans and the total value of loss (in negative term) in the previous year. The
higher this value is the less degree of soft-budget constraint a firm may face; excessive
debt is calculated as the sum of overdue loans and overdue interest payment at the yearend. Lastly, u it stands for the fixed-effects and ε it is a Gaussian error term.
The estimation of Equation (4.1) requires extra caution because endogeneity
problem may occur. In this particular study, as stated earlier, endogeneity may come from
several sources. First, selection bias may arise if the decision of a firm’s privatization
partially depends on some variables related to the firm’s performance, but unobservable
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to researchers. That is, privit and ε it may be positively correlated. This correlation may be
caused by some time-invariant variables. Such time-invariant variables may include
locations, industries or the relationships between management and local officials. A fairly
straightforward panel data transformation procedure can remove these time-invariant
effects. Thus, we take first-difference of Equation (4.1) to remove the fixed-effects u it .
(4.2) y it − y it −1 = β1 (lit − l it −1 ) + β 2 (k it − k it −1 ) + β 3 ( privit − privit −1 ) + β w ' ( wit − wit −1 )
+ β yr ' ( yearit − yearit −1 ) + (ε it − ε it −1 )

However, it is also possible that some unobserved variables may be time-variant.
For example, the quality of a manager’s managerial skills may likely influence a firm’s
privatization decision as well as its performance. Since better performing SOEs are more
likely chosen for privatization, ε it will continue to be positively correlated with privit
and an upward bias will persist in the estimated coefficients. Second, a firm’s current
performance may also affect its future privatization decision, which suggests that ε it may
be correlated with privit +1 , a firm’s ownership status in the next period. In that event, the
strictly exogenous condition for panel data estimation is violated and a new source of
endogeneity is introduced after first-differencing Equation (4.1). To be specific, the term
( privit − privit −1 ) becomes more correlated with new error term (ε it − ε it −1 ) because they
include terms privit and ε it −1 . Given that a better performance in the previous year may
raise people’s expectation for privatization in the next period, this bias will also generate
upwardly biased coefficients. Lastly, poorly reported value for asset and output may
introduce measurement error into our regression. Measurement error tends to bias the
values of estimated coefficients toward zero.
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To control for the endogeneity problems caused by selection bias, firstdifferencing, and measurement error, this paper adopts an instrumental variable
estimation. Equation (4.2) is thus considered as the main model specification in this study
and privatization dummy will be treated as an endogenous variable.
The Choice of Instrumental Variables
How to choose instrumental variables is a daunting task for researchers because a
qualified instrumental variable has to meet two requirements. First, it must be relevant to
the included endogenous variable. If the instrumental variables are not or only weakly
correlated with the endogenous variable, Equation (4.2) may become unidentified.
Second, the instrumental variable must be distributed independently of the error term in
Equation (4.2). If it fails to be orthogonal to the error term, the endogeneity issue will
reemerge in Equation (4.2). Therefore, we need to carefully weigh our choices of
instrumental variables based on these two criteria: relevance and orthogonality.
To find instruments relevant to the privatization dummy, one needs to examine
the privatization process in China closely. Privatization in China is mainly driven by the
central government policies. After several failed attempts to revive the performance of illmanaged SOEs without giving up state controls, the central government began to
advocate a “grasping the large and letting go of the small” policy since 1996. The
adoption of this policy is grounded on a realization that with the ever-increasing market
competition it becomes very costly for the government to continue to subsidize smaller
SOEs operating in some less important, but very competitive markets.

45

Although the implementation of this policy has been mostly ambiguous, Mattlin
(2007) and Yao (2005) examine several hypotheses on causes of privatization. They find
that the causes leading to a firm’s privatization in China can be summarized as the
following. First, an SOE’s current performance is an important factor for the state to
decide whether to privatize it or not. Local governments have incentives to privatize
better-performing SOE first because doing so may help them to ease their budgetary
constraints and maintain the momentum for future reforms. Second, workforce
redundancy at a firm may hinder its privatization process. One of the most prominent
concerns for the Chinese government in prompting SOE restructuring is the potential
massive layoffs and its resulting social unrest. Therefore, firms with more redundant
workers may have a lower propensity to be privatized. Third, market competition is found
to have significant influence on a firm’s privatization tendency. Firms operating in a more
competitive market are more likely to be privatized first because they are more likely to
become financial burdens to the local governments due to their slim profit margins.
Although a higher degree of market liberalization may cause SOEs’ performance to
deteriorate, it may also promote more private interests and capabilities to privatize local
SOEs. Hence, a SOE may be more likely to be privatized if it operates in a more
competitive market environment.
To quantify the causes of privatization in China, net asset per worker, ratio of
number of xiagang workers to that of total employees, and percentage of workers
employed by private enterprises in each province are constructed to measure a firm’s
performance, worker redundancy and market competition, respectively. Net asset per
employee is calculated as net asset of a firm divided by its total number of employees.
46

When a Chinese SOE undertook restructuring reforms, current employees of that SOE
were either retained or let go and became redundant workers. The retained workers would
continue to work with full compensation. They are thus named “working employees” or
“on-duty workers” in this study. The workers who are let go normally become “xiagang”
or layoff. Different from being laid off, in which case a worker’s ties to the firm may be
entirely severed, a “xiagang” worker refers to the one who is no longer actively working
but still receiving minimum benefits from firms. To account for degrees of market
liberalization in each province, the total number of employees working at private sectors
in each province covered in the survey is collected from the National Bureau of Statistics
of China database. A higher ratio of private employees to the total working employees in
a province indicates a higher degree of market liberalization.
To meet the orthogonality condition, the instrumental variables are constructed
with one period lag of the aforementioned performance, redundancy and competition
variables. The rationale of using lagged values as instrumental variables is twofold. First,
a firm’s performance, worker redundancy and competition that it faced from the previous
period is more likely to help determine its privatization in the current period, but less
likely to affect its current productivity. That is, corr ( IVit −1 , ε it ) = 0 . Second, the
endogeneity in Equation (4.2) caused by the first-differencing can be addressed. Recall if
corr ( privit , ε it −1 ) is significantly positive, then a better-performing firm is more likely to
be chosen for future privatization. Thus, the first-differenced terms
( privit − privit −1 ) and (ε it − ε it −1 ) are also correlated. When the lagged values of
performance, redundancy and competition are used to instrument the first-differenced
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privatization term, our endogeneity concern is then on the possible correlation between
IVit −1 and (ε it − ε it −1 ) , which should be close to zero. This assertion is substantiated by an
over-identification test in the next section.
Moreover, instead of taking first-difference of instrumental variables, Wooldridge
(2001) suggests that instrumental variables used in a first-differenced panel estimation do
not have to be first-differenced themselves. Since there are only seven years in our panel,
using lagged first-differenced instrumental variables will cost us two years of data and
subsequently decreases the degree of freedom of our estimation significantly. Therefore,
only the lagged level values of performance, redundancy and competition are used as
instruments in this study. For the same reason, only one lag of instruments is considered.
Based on Equation (4.2) the final specification of the estimation equation can be
shown as follows:
(4.3) y it − y it −1 = β1 (lit − lit −1 ) + β 2 (k it − k it −1 ) + β 3 ( privit − privit −1 ) + β w ' ( wit − wit −1 )
+ β yr ' ( yearit − yearit −1 ) + (ε it − ε it −1 )

Where, the included endogenous variable is ( privit − privit −1 ) ; the included instrumental
variables are (lit − lit −1 ) , (kit − kit −1 ) , ( wit − wit −1 ) , and ( yearit − yearit −1 ) ; the excluded
instrumental variables are performanceit −1 , redundancyit −1 , and competitionit −1 .
(ε it − ε it −1 ) follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance δ ε2 , but is not
assumed to be distributed independently. The model allows arbitrary heteroskedasticity
and intra-cluster correlations. An instrumental variable general method of moment (IVGMM) suggested by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2002) is adopted to estimate Equation
(4.3).
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Empirical Tests and Findings
By estimating Equation (4.3) with IV-GMM, we can study the impacts of
privatization on Chinese firms’ productivity not only on the year of conversion but also
on multiple post-privatization periods. In addition, the effects of partial privatization and
a variety of different private ownerships on firm’s productivity are also examined with
fixed-effects estimations. As alternatives to privatization, the effects of some nonownership-change reforms on productivity changes among the remaining SOEs are
further evaluated. Lastly, to conclude this section, some policy implications on Chinese
SOEs restructuring based on our findings are discussed.
Tests for Endogeneity and Heteroskedesticity
To justify the adoption of IV approach in this study, a Hausman endogeneity test
is carried out to compare a consistent estimator (IV estimator) with an efficient estimator
(OLS estimator). The test statistic is reported in Table 10. The OLS estimators are
obtained with a pooled OLS estimation with Equation (4.2). The IV estimators are
obtained after a two stage least square (2SLS) estimation based on Equation (4.3). The
null hypothesis is that the IV estimators are not systematically different from the OLS
estimators. As Table 10 shows, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis at 10 percent
significance level. Thus, there are variables correlated with Equation (4.2)’s disturbance
terms and treatments for endogeneity are necessary and desired.
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Table 10. Hausman Specification Test for Endogeneity
−1 ˆ
2
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
( βˆ IV − βˆOLS )' (Ω
βIV − Ω βOLS ) ( β IV − β OLS ) ~ χ (9)
Null hypothesis:
consistent estimator ( β̂ IV ) is not systematically different from inconsistent estimator
( β̂ OLS )
Chi-square statistic: 15.090
Note:

P-value 0.084

β̂ IV is the instrumental variable estimator and estimated by two stage least squares. β̂ OLS is the

ordinary least square estimator.

Ω̂ βIV and Ω̂ βOLS are the estimated covariance matrix of IV and OLS

estimators. The degree of freedom of chi-square is 9.

To address potential endogeneity problems, instrumental variable approach poses
as a natural choice. By carefully choosing exogenous instruments, this approach can
ideally produce efficient and consistent estimators. Among all IV estimation strategies,
the 2SLS approach has been popular because, unlike GMM, 2SLS is exactly identified.
Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2002) suggest that with absence of heteroskedasticity, a
2SLS IV estimator tends to be more efficient than a GMM IV estimator. However, they
also suggest that if the homoskedasticity assumption is violated, a GMM IV approach
would be more preferable. Hence, to decide which IV strategy is more appropriate for the
model here, a Pagan-Hall heteroskedesticity test is implemented. The test statistic is
reported in Table 11. The test is based on the estimated residuals of Equation (4.3) after a
2SLS estimation. The null hypothesis is that the IV estimation’s disturbances are
homoskedastic. A chi-square statistic of 25.501 rejects the null hypothesis at 5 percent
significance level. Therefore, an IV-GMM approach is favored and used to estimate the
effects of privatization on firms’ productivity growth. Nevertheless, the adoption of the
IV-GMM approach inevitably raises questions of identification. To address these, tests
for identification is discussed in the next section.
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Table 11. Pagan-Hall Test for Heteroskedesticity in the IV Estimation
Null hypothesis: IV estimation’s disturbances are homoskedastic
Pagan-Hall test statistic: 25.501 P-value 0.030

Note: This is a test for heteroskedesticity for instrumental variable estimations. The test statistic has a chisquare distribution with 14 degree of freedom.

The Impacts of Privatization on Firms’ Productivity (IV-GMM Results)
The validity of instruments is vital for the success of IV estimations. As discussed
earlier, a qualified instrument must meet two requirements: relevance and orthogonality.
On the relevance aspect of instruments, we consider a group of variables representing the
firms’ performance, market competition, and worker redundancy. These variables have
been widely regarded as causes of privatization in China. After numerous regressions of
possible instruments on the dummy variable of privatization, three variables emerge as
our choice of instruments: net asset per worker, the ratio of the total number of employees
in private sectors to the total number of working population in each province, and the
ratio of xiagang workers to the total number of employees at each firm. A pooled OLS is
estimated and the estimation specification is shown as follows.
(4.4) d ( privit ) = α 0 + α 1 g (employee) it + α 2 g (asset ) it +

2000

∑ w dyr

j =1996

j

itj

+ β 1 d (manageshareit )

+ β 2 d (burdens) it + β 3 d (debt ) it + β 4 d ( softbudget ) it
+ γ 1 performanceit −1 + γ 2 redundancyit −1 + γ 3 competitionit −1 + υ it
The dependent variable in Equation (4.4) is the first-difference privatization
dummy. The independent variables include all explanatory variables from the structural
model (Equation (4.2)) as included instruments and the lagged performance, redundancy
and competition variables as excluded instruments. Table 12 reports the estimation
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results. All excluded instruments are significant at 10 percent significance level and
consistent with findings from previous literature. Firms with higher net asset per
employee or facing increased market competition are more likely to be privatized whereas
higher worker redundancy hinders privatization decision. As Wooldridge (2002) points
out, level variables may tend to be weakly correlated with first-differenced variables.
Such weak correlations between instruments and endogenous variables may cause the IV
estimation to produce biased estimators. Therefore, an F-test and Kleibergen-Paap
Lagrangian multiplier tests (K-P LM) are implemented to examine the relevance of the
excluded instruments. These tests have been recommended by Baum, Schaffer and
Stillman (2002). The null hypothesis of the F-test is that the estimated coefficients of the
excluded instruments are not jointly different from zero. The test statistic is shown in the
upper rows of Table 13 and the null hypothesis is rejected at 10 percent significance level.
The null hypothesis of the K-P LM test is that the coefficient matrix of Equation (4.4)
does not have full rank, an indication of weak correlation between the excluded
instruments and the endogenous variable. Thus, failing to reject the null hypothesis would
suggest that the model is underidentified. Similar to the F-test results, The K-P LM test
results reinforce our choice of instruments by rejecting the null hypothesis at 10 percent
significance level.
Table 14 reports results from estimating Equation (4.3) with OLS, 2SLS, and IVGMM, the preferred model specification, and illustrates the impacts of privatization on
firms’ productivity in China, the central focus of our interest. First, to one’s surprise, it is
found that productivity growth rate at privatized firms is not significantly higher than that
at SOEs in the year of conversion. This finding may be largely attributed to transition
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costs. Jefferson and Su (2006) argue that the impacts of privatization may not be
immediately observable since the initial gains may be offset by the costs of transition. If
ownership transformation does matter to firms’ efficiency improvement, its effects would
more likely emerge later in the post-privatization periods.
Second, all reform measures but management incentive are shown to improve
firms’ productivity significantly. Easing workforce redundancy and excessive debts may
contribute to productivity growth by 37.3 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively. In
addition, the effect of hardening soft-budget constraint on productivity growth is found to
be significant although the magnitude is small. Third, regarding the impacts of production
factor growths on firms’ productivity growth, labor input has on average boosted output
growth by 20.8 percent from 1995 to 2001 and the comparable contribution of capital
input on productivity growth is higher, with the average of 43.5 percent impact during the
same period.
Third, coefficients from time dummies indicate a “V” shape change in firms’
productivity growth in China from 1996 to 2001. The growth rates of productivity have
continuously decreased by 8, 10.8 and 21.8 percents in China from 1996 to 1998,
respectively. The decreasing trend of productivity growth continued in 1999, but it
slowed to 11.1 percent. Such persistent falls of productivity growth rates may be
attributed to the tightened monetary policies in China from 1995 to 1998. With erratic
economic growths from 1980s to 1995, China experienced serious inflation in 1993-1995.
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Table 12. Causes of Privatization
(Pooled OLS of Equation (4.4))
Pooled OLS
Dependent variable: D(private)
constant
0.004
(0.008)
g(on-duty workers)
0.003
(0.004)
g(asset)
-0.048*
(0.027)
D(year 1996)
-0.002
(0.004)
D(year 1997)
-0.005
(0.008)
D(year 1998)
0.011
(0.013)
D(year 1999)
0.008
(0.013)
D(year 2000)
0.002
(0.009)
D(manager share)
0.013***
(0.001)
D(social burdens)
-0.01
(0.012)
D(excessive debt)
0.004
(0.005)
D(soft budget)
0.000
(0.000)
lag (competition)
0.439*
(0.213)
lag (redundancy)
-0.018*
(0.008)
lag (performance)
0.001*
(0.000)
Number of obs: 1184
R-square: 0.507

Note: This table presents the pooled estimation of Equation (4.4). g, D and lag refer to growth, first
difference and lag term, respectively. It is used as specification for F and K-P LM underidentification tests.
Competition is the ratio of private sector employees to total employees in each province. Redundancy is the
ratio of xiagang workers over total employees of a firm. Performance is the net asset per employee. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis and *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels
respectively.
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Table 13. Underidentification Test for IV-GMM Estimation
F-test of excluded instruments
H0: the estimated coefficients of instruments are jointly equal to zero
F test statistic: 2.38 Prob > F: 0.069
Kleibergen-Paap LM test for underidentification
H0: Matrix of reduced form coefficients does not have full rank (underidentified)
Chi-square statistic: 7.16 P-value: 0.067

Note: This table reports two underidentification tests for the excluded instruments based on Equation (4.4).
The F-test is a joint test and the K-P test is a Lagrangian multiplier test. Reduced form refers to Equation
(4.4). The F-test and K-P LM test both have 3 degrees of freedom.

The inflation rate in China had increased to 14.7 percent from 6.4 percent a year
before and peaked at 24.1 9 percent in 1994. To tame the inflation, Chinese government
dramatically restricted state-owned banks lending practice. As a result, inflation dropped
sharply after 1995 and so did the GDP growth rate. Chinese GDP growth rates declined
steadily from 10.9 percent in 1995 to 7.6 percent in 1999 and subsequently slowly
recovered to 8.4 percent in 2000. 10 Taking these policy changes into account, our
estimation results on time dummies have well captured the impacts of these overall
economic slowdowns.
Lastly, a Hansen J test is used to examine if the excluded instruments are
correlated with the structural model’s disturbance term. The null hypothesis of the test is
that the excluded instruments are not orthogonal to the model disturbance. Table 15
shows the test statistic. The chi-square statistic is 0.568, which fails to reject the null
hypothesis. We also conduct a C-test to see if any other variables in the structural model
(Equation (4.2)) should be considered as endogenous in addition to the privatization

9

The data are from 2009 World Economic Outlook by International Monetary Fund.
The data are from World Development Indicators by World Bank.

10
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dummy. The test results indicate that only the privatization dummy should be considered
as endogenous and receives IV treatment.
The Dynamics of Privatization
Besides the contemporaneous effects of privatization on firms’ productivity, the
dynamics of privatization, post-privatization in particular, are also worth exploring.
Although privatization may fail to exhibit any significant impacts in the year of
conversion due to various causes, its effects may begin to appear after the early transition
periods. To estimate the effects of privatization in the post-transition periods, we
construct two time dummies, 1st year and 2nd year after privatization, to replace the
privatization dummy in Equation (4.3) and estimate the equation with IV-GMM. The
estimated coefficients are reported in Table 16 and the results from a pooled firstdifference OLS model are also presented in Table 16 for comparison. Being limited by
the short time series of the data, only two years post-privatization effects are studied. The
IV GMM estimation finds that firms’ productivity has, on average, increased by 214
percent after the first year of conversion. However, the effects faded out and became
negative and insignificant in the second year after privatization.
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Table 14. Impacts of Privatization on Firms’ Productivity
Dependent variable
OLS
2SLS
IV-GMM
g(output)
constant
-0.031*
-0.064*
-0.068**
(0.018)
(0.038)
(0.034)
d(private)
0.038
3.699
3.648
(0.159)
(3.251)
(2.902)
g(on-duty workers)
0.245***
0.234***
0.208**
(0.056)
(0.069)
(0.085)
***
***
g(asset)
0.272
0.442
0.435***
(0.074)
(0.176)
(0.166)
***
d(year 1996)
-0.106
-0.091*
-0.088**
(0.040)
(0.052)
(0.038)
***
d(year 1997)
-0.137
-0.105
-0.108*
(0.050)
(0.068)
(0.058)
***
***
d(year 1998)
-0.191
-0.215
-0.218***
(0.051)
(0.063)
(0.068)
**
d(year 1999)
-0.099
-0.109*
-0.111*
(0.047)
(0.057)
(0.065)
d(year 2000)
-0.043
-0.040
-0.043
(0.037)
(0.045)
(0.052)
d(manager shares)
-0.002
-0.051
-0.050
(0.003)
(0.044)
(0.039)
d(social burdens)
-0.424***
-0.380**
-0.373*
(0.131)
(0.158)
(0.207)
d(excessive debts)
-0.037**
-0.054**
-0.053**
(0.017)
(0.025)
(0.024)
d(soft budget)
0.000
0.000
0.000**
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Obs.
1194
1184
1184
R-square
0.069
Root MSE
0.698
0.692

Note: OLS reports the pooled OLS first-differenced estimation results. 2SLS reports a standard 2 stage least
square estimation results without adjusting for heteroskedesticity and intra-cluster. IV-GMM reports the
baseline instrumental variable general method of moment results based on Equation (4.3). Standard
deviations are in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively.
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Table 15. Overidentification and Endogeneity Tests
Overidentification Test
H0: Instruments are not orthogonal to the model disturbance
Hansen J statistic: Chi-square 0.568
P-value 0.753
Endogeneity Test
H0: the endogenous variable d(private) can be treated as an exogenous variable
C-test statistic: Chi-square 3.064 P-value 0.080

Note: The overidentification jointly tests if all instruments (included and excluded) are correlated with the
error term. The endogeneity test examines if the chosen endogenous variable df(private) can be
appropriately considered as an endogenous variable. These two tests are documented by Baum, Schaffer,
and Stillman (2002).

Moreover, we analyze whether or not and to what degree the endogeneity
problems have been controlled by the preferred IV-GMM estimation approach. The test
strategy is adopted from Brown et al. (2006). Brown et al. (2006) illustrate that without
properly addressing selection bias, firms tend to exhibit significant improvements on their
performance in the immediate years prior to privatization because managers have
incentives to make their firms look better to attract future private buyers or owners. On
the other hand, such anticipatory effects should disappear if selection bias is sufficiently
controlled. Following this strategy, we replace the privatization dummy in Equation (4.3)
with two time dummies: one year and two years prior to privatization. The estimation
results are presented in Table 17. All pre-privatization dummies are significantly positive
in the years prior to privatization in the first-difference OLS specification whereas no
anticipatory effect is found in the IV-GMM specification. This result further indicates that
OLS estimation may pose serious selection bias problems and that the endogeneity
problems have disappeared after the model is estimated with the IV GMM approach.
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Table 16. Effects of Post-Privatization on Firms’ Productivity
Pooled first-differenced OLS
IV-GMM
Dependent: g(output)
Dependent: g(output)
Constant
d(1st year after private)
d(2nd year after private)
g(On-duty workers)
g(Asset)
d(Year dummies)
d(Manager shares)
d(Social burdens)
d(Excessive debts)
d(Soft budget)
N
adj. R2
Root MSE

-0.137
(0.274)
0.117
(0.093)
0.145
(0.118)
0.245***
(0.056)
0.266***
(0.073)
yes

-0.048**
(0.020)
2.140*
(1.006)
-1.191
(4.610)
0.249***
(0.090)
0.150
(0.144)
Yes

-0.001
(0.002)
-0.420***
(0.131)
-0.038**
(0.017)
0.000
(0.000)
1194
0.070

0.000
(0.002)
-0.347*
(0.184)
-0.050**
(0.021)
0.000**
(0.000)
1184
0.696

Note: This table shows the post-privatization effects on firms’ productivity and its growth. All variables in
the OLS specification are in first-difference. All variables in the IV-GMM specification are in firstdifference. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance
levels respectively.
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Table 17. Effects of Pre-Privatization on Firms’ Productivity
Pooled OLS
IV-GMM
Dependent: output
Dependent: g(output)
Independents in levels Independents in first differences
Constant
-0.122
-0.066*
(0.275)
(0.040)
1st year before private
0.219*
3.046
(0.120)
(4.386)
2nd year before private
0.206*
1.385
(0.123)
(13.251)
***
On-duty workers
0.345
0.203
(0.041)
(0.138)
Asset
0.677***
0.103
(0.040)
(0.221)
Year dummies
yes
Yes
Manager shares
Social burdens
Excessive debts
Soft budget
Obs.
adj. R2
Root MSE

0.002
(0.002)
-0.782***
(0.108)
-0.068***
(0.010)
0.000
(0.000)
1562
0.706

0.040
(0.058)
-0.414
(0.289)
-0.015
(0.028)
0.000
(0.001)
1184
0.709

Note: This table shows the anticipation effects of privatization. All variables in the OLS specification are in
levels. All variables in the IV-GMM specification are in first-differences. Standard deviations are in
parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively.

Partial Privatization and Different Types of Private Ownership
Among different ways of reforming SOEs, partial privatization has been
highlighted as a favored model for SOE restructuring by Chinese policymakers. Chinese
government believes that partial privatization can introduce new private capital and
technology to ailing SOEs, but at the same time help to preserve the state control.
Without much radical reform, social stability can also be maintained at a partially
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privatized SOE. In line of this belief, Amess, Du and Girma (2009) find that unlike full
privatization, partial privatization tends to cause job creation and that partial privatization
also results in wage increase for employees. However, the effectiveness of partial
privatization on productivity is still uncertain. Indeed, a partial privatization may
stimulate a firm’s performance in many ways, such as technological change, profitability,
and corporate governance, etc. On the other hand, with only minor shares sold to private
investors, the state may continue to exercise substantial influence over firms’ operation
and thus fail to boost reformed SOEs’ efficiency.
To provide further insights on this issue, the effects of partial privatization are
estimated. A firm is considered being partially privatized if the total private shares in a
firm exceeds 0 percent but are equal to or fewer than 50 percent. An IV-GMM approach
based on Equation (4.3) with the remaining SOEs is first considered to address the
possible endogeneity problem. The endogeneity test results (C-test) show that the partial
privatization dummy is not endogenous. As a result, the IV approach is probably not
necessary. Nonetheless, a Hausman test still warns the possible presence of endogeneity
and favors fixed-effects approach. The fixed-effects results for partial privatization are
presented in Table 18 along with results from OLS. Without controlling for endogeneity,
the OLS results indicate a significant and positive effect of partial privatization whereas
partial privatization becomes insignificant after individual effects are controlled for in the
fixed-effects estimation. To examine the dynamics of partial privatization, two postpartial privatization binary indicators are also included in the fixed-effects estimation and
none of them appear significant. In sum, partial privatization probably should not be
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regarded as an equal alternative to full privatization because it fails to exhibit any
significant impacts on SOEs’ productivity improvements.
In addition to partial privatization, the effects of four different types of private
ownerships are shown in the lower portion of Table 18. These four categories of private
ownership are insider, outsider, domestic and foreign privatizations, respectively. Insider,
outsider and domestic, foreign are estimated separately in two estimations with the same
set of explanatory variables as in Equation (4.3). Table 18 shows that there is no
contemporaneous effect from any type of private ownership. However, when postprivatization dummies (two years after privatization) are included (not shown here),
productivity at SOEs privatized by insiders has increased by 27 percent with 10 percent
significance level after the first year of conversion. Nonetheless, this effect quickly fades
in the second year after conversion. Previous literature has found that the effects of
insider privatization are mixed at most. Li and Rozelle (2003) argue that performances of
insider privatized firms are dependent on the sale price paid by the insiders in China.
Firms owned by insiders who paid price exceeding the book value more likely will
perform better. Blanchard and Aghion (1996) study privatization in Eastern European
countries and find that insider ownership actually impedes further desirable
restructurings.
The significant effects of insider privatization in our study may suggest several
explanations. First, after aligning property rights with corporate governance, firms’
efficiencies are improved dramatically because managers and workers become better
motivated. That positive effects quickly fade out in the following periods reflects some
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inherent flaws of insider privatization, such as lack of new funding, higher wages and
more importantly diffused ownerships (Estrin and Rosevear (2003) pp.462-465).
Table 18. Effects of Partial Privatization and Different Private Ownerships on Firms’
Productivity
OLS
FE
Dependent variable: output
Partial privatization
0.006*
0.007
(0.003)
(0.007)
Insider privatized
Outsider privatized
Domestic privatized
Foreign privatized

-0.293
(0.173)
0.103
(0.108)

0.121
(0.212)
0.012
(0.168)

-0.050
(0.099)
0.485
(0.297)

0.022
(0.148)
0.237
(0.365)

Note: This table shows the effects of partial privatization and insider, outsider, domestic and foreign
privatization. Partial privatization refers to that the total private shares in a firm ≤50%, but ≥0%. So, a
partially privatized firm is still considered as an SOE. Insider, outsider and domestic and foreign privatized
are firms in which insider, outsider, domestic and foreign shares exceed 50 percent, respectively. So, these
firms are considered as privatized. All estimations in this table are done based on Equation (4.2)’s
specification with the privatization binary indicator replaced by private shares or insider and outsider
privatization dummies or domestic and foreign privatization dummies. Standard deviations are in
parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively.

Non-Ownership-Change Restructurings
The retreat of state control on SOEs has been slowed down dramatically in the
past decade. Imai (2006) quotes the cost of financing restructuring, the role of the State as
the dominant shareholder, and the balance between the state’s and managers’ interests as
major constraints of motivating deeper reforms. Thus, keeping and managing some SOEs
have become increasingly attractive to Chinese government. Mattlin (2007) also closely
examines the latest attempts by the state to retain and manage large SOEs. By adopting
some efficiency-oriented non-ownership-change restructurings, the state hopes that the
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remaining SOEs can not only survive but thrive in this new economy. As such, most of
SOEs have been forced to go through at least one form of non-ownership-change
restructuring during the survey period. However, the impacts of restructurings without
relinquishing state ownership on SOEs’ productivity are still largely unknown.
To shed lights on the productivity effects of non-ownership-change restructuring,
we use a fixed-effects model with data excluding privatized firms. The model
specification can be written as
(4.5)

output = α 0 + α 1employeeit + α 2 asset it +

2000

∑

j =1996

7

w j dyritj + ∑ ρ j (restructurings ) itj + vit
j =1

where restructurings include internal restructuring, bankruptcy, IPO, employee
shareholding, open sales, leasing and joint venture. The results are reported in the first
two columns in Table 19. The OLS results are presented for comparison purpose. In the
fixed effects model, none of the non-ownership-change restructuring policies is
significant. However, all production factors and time dummies exhibit predicted signs
and are also significant. One possible explanation to the insignificance of the
restructuring variables is that these restructuring efforts are primarily targeting at the
reallocation of property rights and thus they do not directly affect firms’ efficiency if no
further steps are taken to address issues like managerial incentives, social burdens,
excessive debts or soft-budget constraints. Thus, without controlling these reform
measures, non-ownership-change restructuring by itself may not be as effective as the
policy makers think.
To test the validity of this argument, we revise Equation (4.5) by taking into
account of the aforementioned reform measures. The results are shown in the last two
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columns of Table 19. Among all reform measures, the coefficients of social burdens and
excessive debts appear to have negative effects on productivity improvement at 1 percent
significance level. More importantly, leasing, as a non-ownership restructuring, increases
SOEs productivity by 55 percent and this result is significant at 10 percent significance
level. Nonetheless, all other restructurings continue to show insignificant effects on
productivity. It seems that the effectiveness of various non-ownership-change
restructurings is different and that there is an optimal sequence for non-ownership
reforms to be truly effective. Without reducing an SOE’s social obligations and easing its
excessive debts first, any restructuring efforts may end up in vain. Likewise, if these two
problems can be appropriately addressed before any restructuring measures take place,
leasing SOEs to investors may be a more rewarding strategy if the priority of
policymakers is to revitalize firms’ productivity.
Table 19. Effects of Non-Ownership Restructuring on Firms’ Productivity
OLS
FE
OLS
FE
Dependent
without other
without other
with other
with other
output
reforms
reforms
reforms
reforms
***
***
***
On-duty worker
0.609
0.503
0.319
0.362***
(0.026)
(0.033)
(0.035)
(0.056)
***
***
***
Asset
0.454
0.484
0.757
0.518***
(0.023)
(0.056)
(0.032)
(0.080)
**
***
**
1996
-0.179
-0.161
-0.183
-0.159***
(0.080)
(0.044)
(0.092)
(0.059)
***
***
**
1997
-0.255
-0.260
-0.219
-0.196***
(0.081)
(0.045)
(0.090)
(0.060)
***
***
**
1998
-0.244
-0.317
-0.201
-0.243***
(0.082)
(0.047)
(0.091)
(0.064)
1999
-0.202**
-0.285***
-0.160*
-0.189***
(0.083)
(0.049)
(0.092)
(0.068)
2000
-0.106
-0.252***
-0.068
-0.148**
(0.084)
(0.051)
(0.094)
(0.071)
2001
-0.036
-0.201***
-0.038
-0.164**
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Table 19—Continued
Dependent
output
Internal Res
Bankruptcy
IPO
Shareholding
Open sales
Lease
Joint venture

OLS
without other
reforms
0.113
(0.101)
-0.199
(0.154)
0.533***
(0.178)
0.588***
(0.116)
0.481**
(0.222)
0.304**
(0.139)
1.151***
(0.279)

FE
without other
reforms
0.096
(0.097)
-0.072
(0.177)
0.087
(0.130)
0.208
(0.242)
0.143
(0.154)

OLS
with other
reforms
-0.049
(0.122)
-0.342*
(0.206)
0.380
(0.512)
0.260
(0.158)
-0.531
(0.397)
0.185
(0.201)
0.744**
(0.300)

FE
with other
reforms
0.123
(0.136)
-0.022
(0.299)

0.043
(0.028)
-0.986***
(0.088)
-0.100***
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.284
(0.177)
1407
0.708

0.010
(0.030)
-0.499***
(0.153)
-0.040***
(0.015)
0.000
(0.000)
0.793
(0.645)
1407

0.111
(0.203)
0.111
(0.506)
0.549*
(0.297)

Other Reform Measures
Manager shares
Social burdens
Excessive debts
Soft budget
Constant
Obs.
adj. R2
Within R2

-0.524***
(0.132)
2285
0.617

-0.035
(0.410)
2285
0.225

0.209

Note: This table shows the effects of non-ownership restructuring and other reform measures on remaining
SOEs’ productivity. The estimations are based on Equation (4.2) and only remaining SOEs are considered.
Standard deviations are in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels
respectively.
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CHAPTER V
A RANDOM-EFFECTS STOCHASTIC FRONTIER
ANALYSIS ON CHINESE MANUFACTURING
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
Introduction
This chapter studies the impacts of privatization on Chinese firms’ technical
efficiency by revisiting a very critical phase of privatization in China, namely from 1995
to 2001. During this period, privatization had started to accelerate after a decade of policy
debates and gradually gained its popularity among officials at different levels as means to
improve firms’ performance and reduce governments’ budget burdens. Thus, a study
from this particular period may help one understand the impact and importance of
privatization in the overall history of Chinese reform. Further, it may also shed lights on
future reforms of Chinese SOEs. Impacts of privatization on Chinese firms’ performance
have been studied extensively. However, various empirical studies show ambiguous
effects of privatization on Chinese firms’ productivity. Dong et al (2006) finds that
privatization significantly improves productivity of urban firms in China. Otchere and
Zhang (2001) investigate long-term stock market performance of privatized firms in
China. Their study shows that the privatized firms outperformed their competitors only
after the third year of privatization. However, Chun (2008) argues that what causes SOEs
to fail in China is not because the majority stakes of the failing SOEs are owned by the
state, but rather due to the massive and abrupt transition from a command to a market
economy.
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This chapter differs from previous studies in a few important ways. First, in
addition to privatization, effects of several reform measures not involving ownership
changes on firms’ efficiency are also examined simultaneously. The need to consider
impacts of privatization along with restructuring measures on firms’ efficiency is due to
the fact that the central government also tried several reform policies to boost
performance of the retained large SOEs without giving up controls. These reform policies
include reducing excessive labor force, hardening soft-budget constraint, and offering
incentives to managers, etc. Therefore, without considering these restructuring measures
designed to improve SOEs’ performance, the effects of privatization on firms’ efficiency
may be underestimated. Moreover, impacts of a firm’s financial condition on its
efficiency are also examined. A privatized firm does not necessarily perform better than
SOEs if it faces large debts. So, without controlling for the state of a firm’s finance in the
estimation, the effect of privatization may also be underestimated. Finally, an
unexpectedly worsened macroeconomic environment may also increase a firm’s
inefficiency in short term because the firm will find it very hard to adjust its resource
allocation to the unanticipated economic shocks. Without taking into account of these
unanticipated shocks, the effects of privatization may be underestimated as well. One
possible solution is to use time dummies as controls in the efficiency estimation.
Second, this chapter attempts to address the endogeneity problems encountered in
other studies. Endogeneity has been one of the stickiest problems for empirical studies on
privatization in China. It arises when some unobserved causes of privatization correlate
with explanatory variables in the production function. Then, as one can expect, the
estimated results would be bias. To address this problem, a two-step approach is proposed
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in this chapter. First, a random effect probit model is estimated to fit the probability of
privatization. Second, the fitted value of privatization probability is introduced to the
second-step stochastic frontier estimation to capture the effects of privatization on firms’
inefficiency. To diagnose endogeneity problem, a Heckman endogeneity test is performed
and the results of which confirm the existence of endogeneity. In addition, the usage of
stochastic frontier models requires the distribution of residuals to exhibit a left skewed
shape. Data used in this paper are investigated and it appears that the distributions of
output values at each observed time period indeed exhibit left skewed shapes, justifying
the use of stochastic frontier estimation.
To measure a firm’s efficiency, this chapter adopts a stochastic frontier model first
introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977). A stochastic
frontier model is designed to capture the deviations of a firm’s realized production level
from its production frontier. Different from classical production estimations, a stochastic
model divides the residual of a production function into two components. One is a
symmetrically distributed error term and is considered as measurement error or
production risk. The other is an assumed asymmetrically distributed positive inefficiency
term that may be caused by market structures, types of ownership or inadequate corporate
governance, etc.
The panel nature of stochastic frontier models has been well explored by the
existing literature. A primary question in this group of studies is whether it is appropriate
to model inefficiency as fixed over time. Such a question is important because different
assumptions on changes of inefficiency over time may bear different implications on the
sources of inefficiency. Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and Lee and Schmidt (1993) develop
69

fixed effects and random effects models respectively in which inefficiencies are
considered as time-invarying firm-specific effects. However, numerous attempts have
been made since then to modify these models by adding time-varying features since it is
unlikely that firms’ inefficiency would stay fixed over time.
Among these extended models, a generalized formulation of Battese and Coelli
(1995)’s model is used in this study because of its fitness with the data and its randomeffects feature. In this formulation, the presence of inefficiency is attributed to both the
time-varying and time-invariant sources. The time-varying source is modeled as a scaling
factor on the distributions of the random-effects. It includes all variables that may change
a firm’s efficiency over time. The time-invariant source is modeled as a random firmspecific effect. All individual characteristics that may affect a firm’s efficiency can be
included in the time-invariant term. Although a random-effects model may be subject to
more restrictive assumptions, the merits of such a model, as Greene (2008) argues, may
outweigh its pitfalls under certain conditions. With a random-effects model, the impacts
of time-invariant firm-specific attributes on efficiencies can be estimated whereas policy
implications of those variables cannot be estimated in a fixed-effects setting. To justify
the usage of this random-effects model in this paper, a Hausman test is later conducted
and its results are supportive.
The estimation results suggest several policy implications on privatization process
in China, particularly on impacts of privatization on firms’ efficiency. First, it is found
that the overall technical efficiency of Chinese firms had declined continuously from
1996 to 2001. The decline of efficiency at both SOEs and the privatized firms from 1996
to 1998 may be largely due to tightened bank credits to all firms by the central
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government in an attempt to cool down the overheated economy, bad bank loans and
unexpected Asian financial crisis.
Second, the results also suggest that the efficiencies of SOEs and the privatized
firms began to diverge after 1998. That is, contrary to the quick recovery and continued
improvements of efficiency at the privatized firms, efficiency at SOEs had continued to
deteriorate after 1998. This disappointing result on SOEs may suggest the failures of
reforms at Chinese SOEs and that of the design of privatization policy in China. Any
reforms at SOEs without seriously addressing ownership issues seem unlikely to be really
effective in China. Moreover, by implementing the policy of “retaining the big and letting
go of the small” and forbidding private firms from entering some “critical” industries, the
Chinese government may have shielded the retained large SOEs from competition and
subsequently indulge them to remain inefficient.
Third, it is found, among time-invariant variables, the industry and location in
which a firm operates can significantly affect its efficiency. Finally, among the timevarying causes of inefficiency, privatization, as opposed to social burden and soft-budget,
is found to be significantly improving a firm’s efficiency. Nonetheless, no evidence is
found that managers’ shares and financial wellbeing may affect a firm’s efficiency.
Two-Step Stochastic Frontier Analysis
The endogeneity problem has emerged as a vital empirical issue in various studies
on Chinese SOE reforms. An endogeneity problem may arise because the unobserved
determinants of privatization may be correlated with independent variables in the
production function. The reform of Chinese SOEs has been carefully planned and
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administrated by the central and local governments (Lau (1999)). During this process, the
central or local governments may have systematically selected firms to be privatized for a
variety of reasons. Guo and Yao (2005) find that hardened budget constraints and market
liberalization have significant effects on SOEs’ privatization decision. Lau (1999) also
confirms that the privatization policy in China has been primarily targeted at particular
sizes and industries of SOEs. Therefore, better performance at the privatized SOEs may
not be the direct result of the mere change in ownership, but simply because those SOEs
that were doing better in the pre-privatization period tend to be chosen for privatization
first. To tackle this endogeneity problem, this paper considers a two-step estimation
strategy. The first step involves estimating a random-effects probit model of privatization
in which the estimated (predicted) probability of being privatized will be retained and
used later on as a proxy for ownership in the second step estimation. The second step will
study the impacts of ownership and several other reform measures on firms’ efficiency
with a random-effects stochastic frontier model.
Causes of Privatization for Chinese SOEs
Numerous studies (Guo and Yao (2005), Yusuf et al. (2006) and Chun (2008))
have found that privatization of SOEs in China are very often politically motivated. In
particular, the causes of privatization in China have been closely correlated with policies
on SOE reforms by various levels of Chinese governments.
First, the central government has started to implement a guideline for privatization
of SOEs since 1994. The guideline is generally summarized as ‘take a firm grip on the
large firms in critical industries, let go of the small’ (Lau (1999)). That means firms with
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more assets, employees, and in pillar or strategic industries (such as energy,
telecommunication, and heavy manufacturing etc.) is more likely to be retained by the
central government.
Second, local governments (provincial and municipal level) tend to sell profitable
SOEs first. By doing so, local governments can recover more before those SOEs become
liabilities. Su and Jefferson (2003) find that better performing SOEs are more likely to be
privatized first in China.
Third, China’s market liberalization efforts have significantly accelerated the
proceess of privatization. Increased competitions from private and foreign firms caused
by deregulations in less critical industries have worsened SOEs’ performance. Thus, local
governments have more incentive to sell those poor-performing SOEs to the competing
private and foreign firms.
Fourth, locations of SOEs also influence the likelihood of SOEs’ privatization.
Firms that are located along the eastern coastal areas should be privatized earlier and
faster because of more liberal economic policies and more prospective domestic and
foreign bidders. Unlike those in the east, SOEs in the central and western regions
normally face more rigid government policies and less competition from domestic and
foreign firms.
Fifth, SOEs with heavy social welfare obligations are less likely to be granted for
privatization bidding in that the government is very sensitive to any social unrest that
could be caused by displaced former SOE employees following privatization (Balfour
(2009).
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Lastly, hardened budget constraint faced by SOEs may more likely lead to their
privatization. Soft budget constraint has been considered as one of major factors of
inefficiency at SOEs. In the past the state-owned banks tend to funnel their resources to
the distressed SOEs. However, with banking reform during 90s in China deepened, some
SOEs became less likely to receive state funding relief due to enormous bad loans already
showing on banks’ balance sheets. As a result, Ito (2005) shows that local governments
have incentives to privatize distressed SOEs which failed to secure loans from the Stateowned banks.
Consideration of the above causes of privatization leads to the following
specification for estimating the propensity of privatization.
(5.1)

Pit = α 0 + α i + β ' X it + β j ' Location j + β t ' Yeart + β k ' Indus k + ε it

Where ε it is assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution with zero mean and
constant variances. Pit is the ownership indicator for firm i at time t . Pit = 1 if 50% or
more shares of a firm are owned by private or foreign firms and Pit = 0 if otherwise. X it
is a set of explanatory variables which measures profitability, debt level, worker
redundancy, working employees, assets, tax and degree of soft budget constraint.
All explanatory variables, except soft-budget dummies, are constructed as their
three-year moving average to avoid possible anticipated-effects bias. Profitability is
measured by the returns of asset. Debt level is defined as debt asset ratio. Worker
redundancy is the ratio of the number of redundant workers to that of on-duty workers.
Working employees and assets are logarithms of the number of on-active duty workers
and total assets. Tax is constructed as the ratio between total tax and total assets. Degree
of soft budget constraint is proxied with a dummy variable, which takes the value of unity
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if a firm still has outstanding loans at the year end and has been losing money in the last
three years. 11 In addition, year dummies, location and industries of firms are also included
as controls. Location is defined as North, East and West. North includes cities of Harbin,
Fushun and Tangshan. East represents two cities along the eastern coast (Weifang and
Zhenjiang). West refers to cities of Xining, Lanzhou, Chengdu, and Guiyang. 45
industries from the dataset have been consolidated to 10 industries in this study. 12
The straightforward way to estimate this specification of privatization propensity
is to estimate a fixed-effects probit model. However, results from fixed-effects probit
models are bias since the incidental parameter problem dominates this class of models.
Thus, this paper adopts a random-effects probit model to estimate the propensity of
privatization. The estimated probability of privatization
E ( Pit | X it , Location, Year, Indus) will be retained and introduced as the instrumented
ownership variable in the following random-effects stochastic frontier model.
Random-Effects Stochastic Frontier Analysis
The traditional productivity analysis defines technical inefficiency as the deviation
of actual output from an optimal value. This optimal value can be estimated with a
deterministic production function. Hence, one can examine impacts of external variables
on a firm’s technical efficiency by regressing the estimated inefficiency on a collection of
external variables. However, such a practice tends to ignore that the deviation from a
11

Year 1995 has been dropped since it is the first year of observation. The soft budget constraint dummy is constructed
for year 1996, using only the profitability of a firm in the previous year. Likewise, only the profitability of the two
previous years is used to construct the soft budget constraint dummy of 1997.
12
In this study, we consider 10 industries. The criteria used to categorize these 10 industries resemble that used by
Brown et al (2006), such as, mining and quarrying, food processing, textile industry, timber related industry, petroleum
industry, chemical industry, metal product industry, machinery manufacture industry, electric equipment industry,
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firm’s ideal production may be also caused by some external factors following a
stochastic process, for instance, unexpected machine failures or bad weather. In a
traditional approach, these random uncertainties of production may be simply explained
as inefficiency. Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Broeck (1977) propose a stochastic
production frontier to incorporate these random variables into efficiency analysis. Their
models show that a firm’s production is bounded within its own production frontier and
that this frontier should be collectively determined by a deterministic production function
and a stochastic term. However, the early attempt to apply stochastic frontier under a
panel framework was unsatisfactory because inefficiency was normally assumed to be
firm-specific and time-invariant. This assumption may be unwarranted if inefficiency
does change over time. Battese and Coelli (1995) address this shortcoming and
demonstrate how to incorporate time decaying effects into inefficiency estimation.
However, their original model cannot consider any time-varying factors but only consider
time trend as the cause of inefficiency.
A generalized form of Battese and Coelli’s model is developed to allow both
time-variant and time-invariant inefficiency determinants to enter the model. In this
specification, the inefficiency term is modeled as a multiplication of a truncated normal
distribution and a function of time-variant variables. All time-varying variables, such as
privatization and soft-budget, will influence firm efficiency by entering a scaling-effect
term. That is, changes of these variables may only alter the magnitudes but not the
distributions of firm efficiency over time. Time-invariant variables, such as industry and
location, may alter the means of inefficiency’s distributions. The only panel-specific
production and supply of electric power industry, and others.
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effect of this model is the random inefficiency term. In addition, the estimated probability
of privatization from Equation (5.1) will appear as the ownership variable in the scaling
effect term. By doing so, the endogeneity problem can be addressed and controlled.
Following this generalized model, the following stochastic frontier specification is
considered.
(5.2) y it = α 0 + β ' xit + vit − u it
2

vit ~ N (0, δ v )
u it = hit u i *,
hit = exp(η ' z it ),
2

u i * ~ N + (γ ' Di , δ u ),
t = 1,...T , n = 1,..., N
where y it is a measure of firm performance, namely the gross value of output. α 0 is the
coefficient of a constant term, and xit includes a collection of input variables. u it is a
stochastic term reflecting a firm’s technical inefficiency and is modeled as a product of a
time-varying scaling effect hit and time-invariant individual effect u i * . The magnitudes
of firm i’s inefficiency at time t are determined by a set of time-varying variables
z it which includes the ownership variable. The distribution of firm i’s inefficiency is
considered to be truncated-normal. The underlying mean is allowed to be heterogeneous
and depends on firm-specific characteristics Di . vit is an error term following a normal
2

distribution with mean zero and variance δ v . Random variables vit and u it are assumed
to be independently distributed. The primary interest of this study centers on the
coefficients of time-varying and time-invariant inefficiency determinants η and γ ' .
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A Cobb-Douglas specification is considered for Equation (5.2) and the production
covariates xit include time trend, value of total assets, total number of working
employees, industry and year dummies. Time trend and industry dummies are included to
account for technological changes and industry-specific effects, respectively. Year
dummies are used to control for production shocks caused by changes of overall
macroeconomic policies and conditions. Based on the analysis of data from the previous
section, a decline of output for all firms should be expected in 1997 and 1998 because of
the contractionary fiscal policies and Asian financial crisis.
Time-variant determinants of inefficiency hit include time decay effect, shares
owned by managers, ratio of retired and xiagang workers over total employment, a
dummy variable of soft-budget, debt asset ratio (DAR) and the probability of
privatization retained from Equation (5.1). Efficiency of Chinese manufacturing is
expected to be improved over time because of reforms deepening and increased
competition. More shares owned by managers should imply that more incentives and
autonomy are given to the management. Hence, shares owned by managers should be
positively correlated with firms’ efficiency.
Likewise, a lower percent of total number of employees depending on companies’
welfare payments may also allow firms to be more efficient. In China, privatized firms
are often required to keep redundant workers for a period of time after privatization
because local governments are afraid of any social unrest that may occur as result of
immediate layoffs. Thus, privatized firms may continue to carry social burdens even after
privatization takes place. In addition, firms with soft-budget constraint or facing higher
DAR may be less efficient. The data also suggest that soft-budget is not an exclusive
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phenomenon for SOEs in China. To attract private investors, local governments may
force local branches of state-owned banks to offer loans without adequate dual diligence
and proper assessment. At last, privatized firms should perform better and the coefficient
of privatization is the primary interest of this study. With control of these reform factors,
the effect of privatization on firms’ efficiency in this study is expected to be smaller than
that in previous literature without proper specification.
Empirical Results
Endogeneity Test
A Heckman endogeneity test is first conducted to examine whether or not simply
including an ownership dummy in the efficiency analysis may introduce an endogeneity
problem. In the context of China’s privatization, a better-performing privatized firm may
perform better even prior its privatization because the government may intentionally
select it to privatize first in order to maintain the momentum for reform. The preliminary
data analysis earlier (in Chapter 3) supports this notion. This Heckman test involves two
steps; first, Equation (5.1) is estimated and the residual is retained; second, both the
retained residual and the ownership dummy are included in a linear production function
regression. This linear production function includes time trend, production factors,
industry and time dummies and causes of inefficiency. The model is specified as
(5.3)
9

6

k =1

k =1

output it = α 0 + β1trend it + β 2 workingemployeeit + β 3 asset it + ∑ θ k indusik + ∑ φ k yearik
+ ω1 privit + ω 2 priv _ resit + ω 3 manager _ shrit + ω 4 social _ burdenit + ω 5 soft _ budget it
+ ω 6 DARit + ε it
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If the privatization residuals exhibit significant effects on firms’ performance,
then the existence of endogeneity problem is detected. The estimated coefficients from
Equation (5.3) are reported in Table 20. In Table 20, the results from a pooled OLS model
are presented along with those from a fixed-effects as well as a random-effects model. In
the pooled model, both coefficients of the ownership dummy and the retained
privatization residual are significant with 5 percent significance level. Therefore, the twostep approach considered in this paper is indeed necessary since these results are, to a
great extent, in support of the existence of selection bias caused by the privatization
policies in China.
Further, several preliminary observations on causes of Chinese firms’
performance can be drawn when results from the fixed and the random-effects models are
compared to the pooled model. The significance of privatization and privatization
residuals on firms’ performance disappear in both the fixed and the random-effects
models. This may suggest that panel approaches can ease the concern of the endogeneity
problem. In addition, all three models further confirm the decline of Chinese firms’
output in year 1997 and 1998. During these two years, an average Chinese firm’s output
dropped by 10 percent. Social burden poses as a significant factor that undermines a
firm’s efficiency in all three models. However, the effects of soft-budget constraint are
only significant in the pooled and the random-effects model. In both fixed and randomeffects models, the negative effects of social burden is smaller than that in the pooled
model after individual effects are controlled. None of the effects of manager shares and
debt asset ratio on firms’ performance appear to be significant.
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Table 20. OLS, Fixed, and Random-Effect Production Function Regression Results
OLS (Pooled)
Fixed-Effects
Random-Effects
Constant
-0.313
0.105
-0.311
(0.208)
(0.866)
(0.357)
Time trend
0.023
0.014
0.022*
(0.019)
(0.014)
(0.013)
Working Employee
0.538***
0.567***
0.573***
(0.042)
(0.067)
(0.052)
Asset
0.547***
0.416***
0.495***
(0.038)
(0.108)
(0.053)
Year 1997
-0.142*
-0.089*
-0.101**
(0.080)
(0.048)
(0.048)
Year 1998
-0.137*
-0.114***
-0.118***
(0.074)
(0.045)
(0.045)
Year 1999
-0.047
-0.029
-0.027
(0.071)
(0.044)
(0.043)
Year 2000
-0.048
-0.030
-0.030
(0.074)
(0.044)
(0.044)
Privatization
0.316**
0.001
0.198
(0.131)
(0.196)
(0.156)
Privatization residual
0.294**
0.012
0.116
(0.140)
(0.146)
(0.130)
Managers' shares
-0.001
0.001
0.000
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
Social burden
-0.727***
-0.321**
-0.541***
(0.095)
(0.163)
(0.123)
Soft budget constraint
-0.602***
-0.085
-0.256***
(0.065)
(0.080)
(0.070)
debt asset ratio
0.051
0.029
0.036
(0.055)
(0.052)
(0.046)
Obs
1064
1064
1064
Adj. R-square
0.751
R-square (within)
0.208
0.203
R-square (between)
0.724
0.772

Note: this table reports the estimated coefficients of OLS, fixed effect and random effect models with a
Cobb-Douglas production function. Probability of privatization is derived from the first step random effect
probit model, layoff is the ratio of number of fired over working workers, soft budget constraint is a dummy
variable here and manager’s shares are the percent a firm’s shares owned by its managers. Standard
deviations are in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively.
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Panel Specification Test
A Hausman test comparing Fixed and Random-effects models is implemented
after controlling the endogeneity problem with the first-step estimation. The results from
this test will determine the specification of the stochastic frontier panel model in the
efficiency analysis. The specification in Equation (5.3) is used as the baseline model for
this test. The only modification is to add a firms’ individual-effects term α i . The chisquare statistics of the test are shown in Table 21. The null hypothesis of the test is that
coefficients from fixed and random-effects models are not systematically different. The
P-value 0.8986 fails to reject the null hypothesis. This finding suggests that a randomeffects model can perform as well as a fixed-effects model once the production function
is properly specified and the endogeneity problem is controlled. To further examine the
presence of random effects in this case, a Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test is
conducted. The results are reported in Table 22. Firms’ individual random effects and the
idiosyncratic errors of the regression explain 24 percent and 9 percent of the total
variations of firms’ output, respectively. The factors of production, technological
changes, industry and time dummies, and causes of inefficiency collectively contribute to
the rest of production variations. Table 22 also shows that the variances of firms’
individual random effects are significantly different from zero. These results further
suggest adoption of a random-effects model in the second-step stochastic frontier
estimation.
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Table 21. Hausman Specification Test for Fixed and Random Effects
Null hypothesis: Coefficients from Fixed and Random effects models are not
systematically different
Chi square statistic:

4.19

P-value:

0.8986

Note: This table reports results from a Hausman specification test. The fixed and random-effects models
follow the same specification in Equation (5.3).

Table 22. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test for Random Effects
Standard
Variance
deviation
Output
2.450
1.565

ε it
αi

0.211
0.577
Test: null hypothesis var( α i ) = 0
chi square statistics: 880.87

0.460
0.760

P-value: 0.000

Note: This test examines the existence of random effects. The model considered here follows the same
specification in Equation (5.3). Output is the value of gross output and serves as the dependent variable in
the model. eit is the estimated idiosyncratic random variable and ait is the estimated random effects.

Measuring Firms’ Inefficiency
The application of stochastic frontier models is based on the assumption that the
inefficiency term follows a non-negative distribution. Hence, to justify the use of
stochastic frontier models in this particular study, the distribution of inefficiency from
consistent random-effects production estimation on the dataset is examined. The
distribution should show signs of left-skewness if the positively truncated normal
distribution assumption on the inefficiency term is appropriate. The estimated proxy for
inefficiency is computed from Equation (5.4) below.
(5.4) wˆ it = −( y it − αˆ 0 − αˆ i − βˆ ' X it − eit )
where ŵit is the estimated proxy for firms’ inefficiency from a linear random-effects
production function; α̂ 0 and α̂ i are the estimated constant term and firm-specific random83

effects from Equation (5.3) with random effects; production covariates X it include time
trend, number of working employees, total value of assets, industry and year dummies
and all the coefficients of X it and the estimated overall residual eit are also retained from
estimating Equation (5.3) with random effects.
The summary statistics of ŵit are provided in Table 23. The mean, skewness, and
kurtosis of ŵit are examined over time. The results indicate that the distributions of
firms’ inefficiency are significantly left-skewed during years of 1997, 1998 and 2001, and
values of Kurtosis of these three years also suggest that modeling inefficiency with a
normality assumption may not be very ideal. In addition, although the values of skewness
for years of 1996 and 1999 are positive, one cannot conclude that the inefficiency
distributions of these two years are right-skewed because these values are insignificant.
Thus, in general, the distributions of firms’ inefficiency appear to be non-negative and
this finding further validates the assumption of positively truncated-normal distribution
on firms’ efficiency in Equation (5.2). For the purpose of visual examination of ŵit ’s
truncated normality, the histograms of ŵit ’s distribution are plotted against normal
distributions in Figure 9 and a similar pattern can be observed.
Table 23. Summary Statistics and Skewness/Kurtosis Tests of Random-Effects Residuals
Year
Mean
Stdv.
Median
Skewness
Kurtosis
1996
0.102
0.767
0.102
0.155
3.109
1997
0.058
0.931
0.058
-1.036***
7.606***
1998
0.100
0.878
0.100
-1.099***
6.859***
1999
0.095
0.821
0.095
0.077
3.212
2000
0.148
0.840
0.148
-0.212
3.541
2001
0.133
0.927
0.133
-0.639***
4.378***
Total
0.107
0.862
0.107
-0.544
5.185

Note: The summary of skewness and kurtosis examines the normality of estimated residuals obtained from
Equation (5.4). The distributions of the residuals are compared to normal distributions with the same means
and standard deviations. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively.
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Note: This figure helps visually examine the normality of retained estimated residuals from the randomˆ it + eit . The bars represent densities of the estimated
effects estimation of Equation (5.4), namely w
residuals and the solid lines show densities of normal distributions with the same means and standard
deviations. The histograms of the retained residuals are plotted by years.

Figure 9. Histograms of Random-Effects Residuals
Compared to Normal Distributions
Moreover, it is also critical to test how the distributions of inefficiency vary over
time. With a rather restrictive setup, Equation (5.2) models the heterogeneity of firms’
inefficiency with time-invariant mean and a constant variance. It may not be appropriate
to do so if the dataset suggests otherwise. Table 24 reports results from testing whether
the means and variances of ŵit are time-invariant. The between-groups F-test statistics
fails to reject the null hypothesis that the means of ŵit are not systematically different
over time. Bartlett’s test for equal variance suggests a time-invariant variance for ŵit with
P-value 0.106. On the empirical front, these results may simply indicate that the
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distribution of a firm’s inefficiency can be modeled with a time-invariant mean and a
constant variance in the context of this study.
Table 24. Tests for Time-Invariant Means and Constant Variances of
Random-Effect Residuals
degree of
FSS
freedom
MS
test
Across time
(between groups)
0.882
5
0.176
0.24

P-value
0.947

Bartlett's test for equal variance Chi square = 9.800 P-value = 0.106

Note: This table examines whether means or variances of the retained residuals from the linear randomeffects model (Equation (5.4)) change over time. Two tests are used. First, a standard F-test evaluates if the
means of residuals’ distributions from different years are significantly different. Second, a Bartlett’s test is
considered to evaluate if the variances of residuals’ distributions are significantly different. SS stands for
Sum of Squares and MS stands for Mean Squares, respectively.

The Random-Effects Probit Model on Causes of Privatization
To study the causes of inefficiency, a random-effects probit model (Equation 5.1)
is chosen as the baseline model. The ownership dummy is used as the dependent variable
and the determinants of privatization are selected as independent variables. The purpose
of this estimation is two-fold. First, it helps one to understand what drives the current
privatization in China. In particular, how economic reform policies and the governments
from different jurisdictions decide which SOE to be privatized and which to be retained.
Second, this first step estimation would also generate a new ownership variable
(privatization propensity), which will later address the endogeneity problem in the
stochastic frontier estimation. This baseline estimation includes variables of performance
(ROA and tax), labor redundancy (Redundancy), size (Total employment and Asset),
share distribution (Central and provincial, City, and County shares), year (from year 1997
to 2001), location (North, East and West) and industry dummies (industries 1-9). The
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marginal effects of independent variables are presented in the second column of Table 25.
In addition, a standard random-effects model is also conducted as the robustness test with
the same independent variables, but with the percentage of private shares replacing
ownership dummy as the dependent variable. The resulting marginal effects are shown in
the fourth column of Table 25.
The coefficients of performance variables from both of the probit random-effects
and the logit fixed-effects models confirm that SOEs with better profit margin are more
likely to be privatized or to accept private shares with 5 percent significance level.
However, in contrast to the insignificant effect of tax on privatization decision in the
probit model, the random-effects model shows that firms generating more tax revenues
on average have 47 percent fewer shares from private investors. Such result may reflect
that the governments are inclined to retain SOEs critical to their budgets. This finding is
also consistent with the policy orientation of privatization in China. In general, the
Chinese government’s stance is to undertake gradual rather than drastic reforms. Keeping
control of firms with more tax revenues provides more financial means for the
governments to proceed with gradual reforms. In line with this result, firms with more
redundant workers are less likely (with 0.823 percentage points) to be privatized in the
baseline model. Interestingly, the size of firms seems to pose no impact during
privatization decision-making process. Both the assets and the total employment
coefficients are insignificant. One explanation is that the size effects may be absorbed by
the coefficient of government shares. In other words, governments may be inclined to
control and keep majority stakes in large firms. Indeed, probabilities of privatization
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decrease by 0.035 and 0.039 percentage points respectively if city and county shares
increase by one percentage point.
Moreover, the propensity of privatization also increases significantly over time.
The chance of being privatized in 1998 was only 1.713 percent, whereas the probability
had increased to 2.545 percent in 2001. Such strong and persistent time effects reveal
several additional driving forces of privatization in China.
Dependent
variables
Models
Independent
variables
ROA
Tax
Total employment
Redundancy
Asset
Central and
provincial Shares
City shares
County shares
Year 1997
Year 1998

Table 25. Causes of Privatization
Ownership dummy
Probit RE
Logit FE
6.332**
(2.979)
-5.742
(6.958)
-0.078
(0.356)
-0.823***
(0.334)
-0.085
(0.273)

Private shares
RE
FE

107.761**
(49.840)
-241.101**
(122.257)
-30.970
(27.533)
-25.797**
(12.101)
-2.478
(5.674)

14.499**
(6.860)
-47.781**
(23.509)
0.717
(1.767)
-0.453
(0.318)
-0.931
(1.329)

14.342*
(7.686)
-44.044
(28.256)
8.796*
(5.256)
-0.339
(0.410)
1.504
(2.251)

-5.160
(52.830)
3.318
(4.578)
13.884*
(7.611)

-0.242***
(0.068)
-0.223***
(0.024)
-0.219***
(0.033)
0.248
(1.021)
1.304
(1.015)

-0.037
(0.150)
-0.069**
(0.034)
-0.134
(0.045)
0.007
(1.011)
1.150
(1.012)

-0.245
(230.704)
-0.035***
(0.005)
-0.039***
(0.007)
0.609
(0.676)
1.713***
(0.637)
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Table 25—Continued

Independent
variables
Year 1999
Year 2000
Year 2001
North
East
West
Constant
Log likelihood
Obs.
Var( α i )
Rh0

Ownership dummy

Private shares

Probit RE
1.862***
(0.640)
2.169***
(0.645)

Logit FE
18.814**
(8.953)
22.479**
(10.304)

RE
2.263**
(1.032)
2.021*
(1.072)

FE
2.216**
(1.054)
2.394**
(1.125)

2.545***
(0.647)
0.787
(0.526)
1.055**
(0.544)
0.512
(0.502)
-0.591
(1.613)

26.872**
(11.772)

3.507***
(1.120)
2.264
(2.827)
-2.614
(3.160)
0.969
(2.975)
23.606***
(8.263)

4.511***
(1.212)

-153
1222
2.390
0.705

-4.092
1222

0.365
1192
8.995
0.760

0.018
1192

Rsquar

Note: This table reports estimation results from four models in attempt to examine the determinants of
privatization. The specifications of these four models are based on Equation (5.1). In the probit randomeffects and the logit fixed-effects models, an ownership dummy is used as the proxy for firms’ ownership. It
takes value of unity if private shares in a firm exceed 50 percent. As a robustness test, the percentage of
private shares in a firm is used as a proxy for ownership variable in the random-effects and fixed-effects
models. R-square reported here is between R-square. The variances of random-effects are shown as var( α i )
and Rh0 represents the proportion of the total variance contributed by the random-effects variances.
Standard deviations are shown in the parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance
levels respectively.

First, there is a more mature equity market to finance privatization over time. With the
influx of foreign investors and growing strength of domestic investors after two decades
of reform, alternative financing sources become increasingly available to SOEs and local
governments, thereby facilitating privatization process. Second, the increased competition
caused by further removal of market entry barriers to most sectors of the economy may
have dramatically worsened the financial situations at the less competitive SOEs. As a
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result, local governments may feel the urge to pursue a more rapid approach towards
privatization. Third, the time effects also reflect the shift of governments’ attitudes
toward privatization over time. Recognizing privatization as an important alternative
approach to unload money-losing SOEs, the reformists’ views on privatization had started
to dominate in the local governments. This shift is found to be particularly prevalent in
the cities located in the eastern region. SOEs from the east region are 1.055 percent more
likely to be privatized than those from other regions in the sample. Lastly, not shown in
the table, firms in equipment manufacturing are found more likely to be privatized.
To examine the robustness of these results, a logit fixed-effects model and a
standard fixed-effects model with the percentage of private shares as dependent variable
are also estimated. The results are presented in the third and the last columns of Table 25
respectively. Results from these alternative estimations may differ in magnitudes, but
largely reinforce findings in the baseline model.
Random-Effects Stochastic Frontier Model
The panel stochastic frontier estimation results shown in Table 26 provide
information on factors that may affect firms’ inefficiency. Among the five different
specifications considered in Table 26, our primary interest rests on the generalized
Battesse and Coelli model with normal-truncated normal distribution (Model 5) and its
estimation results are reported in the last column. Results from the other four alternative
stochastic frontier models are also presented in Table 26 for comparison purpose. These
four models include the Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles’ fixed-effects (Model 1), Pitt and
Lee time-invariant with normal-half normal distribution (Model 2), Battesse and Coelli
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(Model 3), and a generalized Battesse and Coelli model with normal-half normal
distribution (Model 4). In this section, effects of time-varying and time-invariant
variables on inefficiency are interpreted based on the Model 5 normal-truncated model.
Furthermore, implications from the other four aforementioned models are examined and
compared against the chosen specification. Finally, the patterns of Chinese firms’
efficiency are studied across time and ownerships.
Effects of Privatization on Firms’ Technical Efficiency
It may seem surprising that the included time trend variable indicates a
continuously deteriorating trend in firms’ efficiency over time in the overall sample. This
finding seems counterintuitive at first glance because efficiencies at Chinese firms are
normally expected to improve over years. However, further examination on efficiencies at
different ownerships can help understand this unusual phenomenon. The estimated
coefficient on privatization shows that efficiency at privatized firms is 15 percent higher
than those at SOEs on average. In addition, social burden and soft-budget constraint
decrease efficiency by another 18 percent and 6 percent, respectively. Variance from the
inefficiency term is attributed to almost 60 percent of the production variance whereas the
overall disturbance error only account for 40 percent of production variance.
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Table 26. Fixed and Random-Effects Stochastic Frontier Results
Cornwell, Schmidt,
and Sickles fixed
effects model
(Model 1)

Pitt and Lee timeinvarying model
(normal-half
normal)
(Model 2)

Battesse and Coelli
baseline model
(normal-half
normal)
(Model 3)

Production function
0.455
0.429
(0.419)
(0.380)

Constant

Time-varying model
with scaling effect
(normal-half normal)
(Model 4)

Time-varying
model with scaling
effect (normaltruncated normal)
(Model 5)

0.655*
(0.390)

2.019***
(0.664)
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Time trend

0.012
(0.012)

0.153
(0.012)

0.074***
(0.018)

0.068***
(0.019)

0.129***
(0.032)

Working Employee

0.646***
(0.057)

0.667***
(0.029)

0.624***
(0.032)

0.525***
(0.042)

0.540***
(0.045)

Asset

0.400***
(0.095)

0.489***
(0.070)

0.480***
(0.066)

0.538***
(0.067)

0.496***
(0.055)

Year 1997

-0.085*
(0.048)

-0.096
(0.069)

-0.100
(0.069)

-0.095
(0.084)

-0.107
(0.085)

Year 1998

-0.114***
(0.045)

-0.119**
(0.054)

-0.124**
(0.057)

-0.119*
(0.067)

-0.131*
(0.070)

Year 1999

-0.031

-0.033

-0.040

-0.038

-0.043

Table 26—Continued
(0.043)
Year 2000

Constant

(0.060)

(0.059)

(0.060)

-0.031
-0.035
-0.043
-0.041
(0.044)
(0.058)
(0.059)
(0.058)
Coefficients of variables determining the mean of inefficiency γ (time-invarying)

(0.058)
-0.044
(0.059)
2.869***
(0.681)

Northern region

-0.092
(0.157)

Eastern region

-0.153
(0.186)

Western region

-0.485***
(0.135)
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Time decay
Privatization
Managers' shares

Coefficients of variables determining the scaling factor η (time-varying)
-0.059***
-0.054***
(0.009)
(0.011)
-0.258
(0.164)
0.000
(0.003)

-0.054***
(0.010)
-0.146*
(0.080)
0.001
(0.001)

Table 26—Continued
Social burden

0.261***
(0.064)

0.183***
(0.049)

Soft budget constraint

-0.010

0.058**

(0.030)

(0.025)

-0.040
(0.058)

-0.005
(0.033)

Debt asset ratio
Composed error vit − u it
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Lambda

3.149***
(0.471)

3.446***
(0.024)

2.988***
(0.035)

1.438***
(0.040)

Sigma (uit)

1.476***
(0.116)

1.608***
(0.373)

1.387***
(0.322)

0.651***
(0.032)

1064
-1000

1064
-1327

1064
-985

1064
-931

obs.
Log likelihood

1064

Note: this table reports the results from all random stochastic frontier models considered in this study. Model 1 is a standard fixed-effects model based on
Cornwell et al. (1990), in which the individual effects are considered as inefficiencies. Model 2 is a standard random -effects model based on Pitt and Lee (1982),
in which individual effects are estimated as inefficiencies. Model 3 is a standard Battese and Coelli (1995)’s time-decaying random effect stochastic model. Time
has scaling effects on the values of inefficiencies. A normal-half normal composed error term is assumed in both Model 2 and Model 3. Model 4 is a random
effect stochastic frontier model in which the mean of individual effects depends on ownership, redundant workers, social burdens, soft-budget constraint, and
managers’ shares. Time is assumed to have no impact on changes of firms’ inefficiencies. Model 5 is a combination of Models 3 and 4. In Model 5, the values of
firms’ inefficiency are determined by a time-varying scaling effect and time-invariant individual effects. The time-varying scaling effect depends on ownership,
redundancy, soft-budget constraint, social burdens and managers’ shares. The means of the time-invariant effects’ distributions depend on time-invariant
variables, such as location. Normal-half normal and Normal-truncated normal distributions are assumed for the composed error terms in Models 3 and 4,
respectively. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis and *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively.

Lastly, shares owned by managers and debt ratio of a firm exhibit no significant
impact on firms’ efficiency. Similarly, results from Models 3 and 4 also indicate a
decrease in firms’ efficiency over time. Nonetheless, only social burden shows positive
effect on firms’ inefficiency at 1 percent significant level. Privatization effect appears not
significant in the Model 4. For effects of time-invariant variables on the means of
efficiency’s distributions, only the western region dummy is significant. This associated
coefficient of western region dummy implies that firms selected from the western region
are on average more productive than those from other regions by 48.5 percent. This
difference is significant at 1 percent significance level.
Turning to the production factors, all specifications reveal a drop of production in
1998 at all firms. The decrease ranges from 11 percent in the Model 1 to 13 percent in the
Model 5. This sudden contraction in output may be largely caused by more restrictive
lending rules and shocks from the unexpected Asian financial crisis. The estimated
marginal effects on production of labor and capital in Model 5 are 0.54 and 0.50
respectively. Likewise, similar results can be found in the other four alternative
estimation models. All models except the Models 1 and 2 show positive and significant
effects of time trend on firms’ output. In particular, time trend has the most impact on
output in Model 5 and its marginal effect is 0.13.
Dynamics of Efficiency Changes and Economic Growth in China
To investigate how Chinese firms’ efficiency has changed over time, the overall
efficiencies of all firms from 1996 to 2001 are estimated with Model 5 following
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Equation (5.2)’s specification. The resulting kernel densities of the estimated efficiencies
from year 1996, 1998 and 2001 are shown in Figure 10. Taking a snapshot of the
dynamics of firms’ efficiency in Figure 10, two questions can be raised regarding the
changes of efficiency at Chinese manufacturing firms and their impacts on Chinese
economic growth. First, even after a decade of enterprise reform aimed at improving
SOEs efficiency, it seems that efficiency at Chinese firms, overall, instead of improving,
has declined consistently from 1996 to 2001. Second, given that the overall performance
of firms has worsened, improved efficiency at enterprises apparently cannot sufficiently

0

.5

density
1

1.5
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explain the last two decades of impressive economic growth in China.

0

.2
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.6
technical efficiency
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Note: This figure shows the kernel densities of estimated efficiencies for all firms during three chosen
periods, 1996, 1998 and 2001. The efficiencies are estimated from Model 5 with Equation (5.2)’s
specification.

Figure 10. Estimated Overall Efficiency for All Firms with Chosen Years: 1996, 1998,
and 2001
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To examine the first question further, statistics of the estimated efficiencies at
different ownerships are summarized and compared in Table 27. It is found that the
overall decrease of efficiency at Chinese manufacturing firms may be largely the result of
increased inefficiency at SOEs, which make up the majority of samples surveyed in our
dataset. Efficiency at SOEs has on average decreased from 0.43 in 1996 to 0.33 in 2001
even after most of SOEs have undergone a series of reforms on corporate governance.
Clearly, this finding casts doubts on the effectiveness of Chinese governments’ efforts to
improve firms’ technical efficiency without restructuring their ownerships. The
gradualism of Chinese overall economic reform may attribute to this receding efficiency
at reformed SOEs in the following ways. First, reformed Chinese SOEs are still subject to
soft-budget constraints because of the intimate relationship between local banks and
provincial and local government officials. Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins (2006) report
that SOEs were still favored in bank lending even after the central government tightened
banks’ credit lending practice.
Second, diversifying state ownership at reformed SOEs does not fundamentally
improve their corporate governance. Normally, smaller SOEs were converted to limited
liability companies (LLC) and larger SOEs were restructured to limited liability
shareholding corporations (LLSC) during the waves of SOE reform in the 1990s. The
purpose of corporatizing SOEs is to grant them with independent legal entity status and
subsequently the governments may be relieved from taking responsibility for firms’ poor
performance. However, in a sample of 1,105 Chinese reformed SOEs, Liu and Sun (2003)
find that 84 percent of them are still controlled by the state (as a majority shareholder) in
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2001 although private ownerships are introduced to these reformed SOEs. Thus, as
minority shareholders, private investors very often do not have voice in business
operations and personnel appointments. Even worse, reform processes at SOEs are
regularly influenced by local politicians. Therefore, it is not surprising that most of
reformed SOEs still behave as pre-reformed SOEs and still face various social
obligations. These factors may jointly undermine efficiency of SOEs and reformed SOEs
in China.
In contrast, estimated efficiency at privatized firms has been consistently higher
than that at SOEs and is on the rise since 1999. Table 27 summarizes the means and
standard deviations of these estimated efficiencies. Furthermore, tests results on whether
the means of the estimated efficiencies at SOEs and those at the privatized firms are
statistically equal from 1996 to 2001 are also shown in Table 27. In spite of insignificant
difference in the early years, efficiency at private firms has been significantly different
from and higher than that at SOEs after 1999. As of 2001, private firms were on average
50 percent more efficient than their SOE counterparts. More interestingly, the standard
deviations of private firms’ efficiency have continuously decreased from 0.17 in 1996 to
0.04 in 2001. This may reflect the fact that efficiencies at firms primarily owned by
private investors have converged over time. The primary cause of this convergence could
be post-privatization effects, increased market competition or simply improved
management skills. Conversely, the standard deviations of SOEs’ estimated efficiency are
roughly the same from 1996 to 2001. The kernel densities of the estimated technical
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efficiency of private firms and SOEs in Figure 22 also confirm this pattern of changes in
efficiency at the private firms and SOEs.
Table 27. Tests for Equal Means of Efficiency at the Privatized and SOEs from
1996 - 2001
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
SOE
0.427
0.397
0.391
0.370
0.351
0.329
(0.019)
(0.018)
(0.019)
(0.019)
(0.019)
(0.019)
Private
0.571
0.449
0.465
0.449
0.477
0.482
(0.167)
(0.117)
(0.067)
(0.053)
(0.040)
(0.037)
Difference = mean (SOEs) - mean (Private)
Difference -0.143
-0.052
-0.073
-0.079*
0.127***
0.152***
Note: All efficiencies are estimated based on Model 5 with Equation (5.2)’s specification. Standard errors
are shown in parenthesis and *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively.

To shed lights on the second question regarding the seeming paradoxical
relationship between rapid economic growth and declining enterprise efficiency in China,
two conjectures are worthy of exploring. First, Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins (2006)
conclude that most of China’s economic growth is attributable not to improvement of
firms’ efficiency, but to intersectoral resources transfer caused by structural reform and to
technological advances as a direct result of heavy investment in industries and
infrastructure. They found that the average growth rate of GDP has diminished as capitaloutput-ratio has increased from 3.96 in 1980-4 to 5.40 to 2000-2 (Yusuf, Nabeshima, and
Perkins (2006) pp.7). As they speculate, this may largely represent “a systematic
misallocation of resources at Chinese firms and lack of enforcement on organizational
restructuring at firms.”
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Note: This figure compares the kernel densities of the estimated efficiencies at SOEs and private
enterprises from 1996 to 2001. The efficiencies at SOEs and private enterprises are estimated based
on Model 5 with Equation (5.2)’s specification.

Figure 11. Kernel Densities of Technical Efficiency of the Private Firms and SOEs,
from 1996-2000
Thus, decreased efficiencies at SOEs and reformed SOEs are not contradictory to
the economic growth in China during the studied period. Furthermore, compared to the
weaker performance at SOEs, efficiency gains from private firms may also tend to
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explain a portion of economic growth in China. Our study also illustrates the same
phenomenon of growing importance of private sector in Chinese economy since 1997-8
in that the weight of gross output produced by private firms has increased from 4 percent
in 1995 to 23 percent in 2001 in our sample.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
China has undergone a series of comprehensive enterprise reforms to revitalize
ailing SOEs. The scheme of reforms includes two major stages. The first stage focused on
non-ownership-change internal restructuring aiming at inducing managers to improve
firms’ performance. The second stage was featured with ownership diversion, notably
privatization. After more than three decade of reform, findings on the effects of these two
stages of reforms on firms’ productivity and efficiency, however, are still mixed. To
contribute to this ongoing inquiry, this study focuses on the impacts of restructuring and
privatization on Chinese SOEs’ total productivity and technical efficiency with a panel
data of 863 Chinese firms in 11 cities from 1995 to 2001.
Chapter 4 is devoted to estimating the impacts of enterprise reforms on Chinese
manufacturing productivity. Previous studies on Chinese SOEs reforms have been mostly
haunted by endogeneity problems. The sources of the endogeneity may come from
selection bias, omitted variables or even first-difference treatment in a panel context. To
address these concerns, privatization dummy at the year of conversion is treated as an
endogenous variable in this chapter and instrumented with three chosen exogenous
variables. These three instrumental variables measure a firm’s performance, worker
redundancy and provincial market liberalization. These factors have been widely
documented in previous studies as important determinants of privatization in China. After
a series of tests, these instruments are proved to be relevant to the endogenous variable
and orthogonal to the disturbance term in the structural model. Due to the presence of
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heteroskedesticity and intra-clustering, the model is estimated with a first-difference IVGMM approach. Further tests confirm that our results are free from endogeneity bias.
Results from Chapter 4 indicate that privatization fails to boost firms’ productivity
in the year of conversion, but it does yield significant and positive impacts until one year
after privatization. The insignificance can probably be explained by transition costs that
occur in the first year of privatization. Moreover, some reform measures shared by SOEs
and privatized firms are also included in the privatization effect estimation because
Chinese SOE reform policies and our survey data both suggest that Chinese firms,
regardless of ownership, may all face some challenges and hindrances that impede
efficiency improvement. These hindrances may range from social burdens resulting from
benefit payments to retired employees, excessive debts, and soft-budget constraint to
management incentives. Without controlling these variables, the coefficient of
privatization is likely biased upward.
In addition, we find that partial privatization leads to insignificant improvement in
productivity at SOEs. To investigate how various private ownerships affect firms’
productivity all privatized firms are disaggregated into insider and outsider or domestic
and foreign privatized firms. Except insider privatization being found to lead to higher
productivity, none of other private ownerships shows impacts on productivity.
Lastly, the effects of several non-ownership-changes restructuring on productivity
are also examined among those firms remained as SOEs. The motivation of this exercise
is largely due to the fact that Chinese government has become more interested in
preserving state control in some strategic SOEs in recent years of reform. Mattlin (2007)
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and Imai (2006) analyze this new phenomenon and contend that some non-ownershipchange restructuring attempts have been made at remaining SOEs to improve their
viability without losing state control. In our evaluation of the effectiveness of this
strategy, we find that non-ownership-change restructurings may become wasteful if softbudget constraint and excessive debts problems are not fully addressed first. Further, even
if a non-ownership-change reform is properly executed, its effect on productivity is still
much lower than that from privatization.
Chapter 5 uses the same data set to estimate and compare impacts of privatization
and various reform attempts on Chinese SOEs’ technical efficiency from 1995 to 2001.
This time period is particularly interesting because privatization has started to gain its
momentum in China after a decade of policy debates and experiments.
To address the endogeneity problem commonly faced by studies on Chinese
privatization, a two-step Heckman-type estimation strategy is adopted. The endogeneity
problem is present due to the gradual nature of Chinese SOE reform. In particular, some
better-performing SOEs are chosen first for privatization since the local governments may
do that deliberately to attract more private investors or rally support to retain momentum
for privatization. A Heckman endogeneity test confirms the presence of the endogeneity
problem and a panel probit estimation subsequently is considered to study the causes of
privatization. The panel probit estimation results further confirm that the likelihood of a
better-performing SOE being privatized is significantly higher than their peers. To
appraise the impacts of privatization and of other reform measures without relinquishing
the state control, a panel stochastic frontier model is estimated in the second step. The
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results show that privatization has significantly improved a firm’s efficiency by 15
percent on average and that hardening budget constraint and relaxing firms’ obligations to
retirees and xiagang workers have also significantly improved a firm’s efficiency by 6
and 18 percents, respectively. Further estimations on the dynamics of firms’ efficiency in
1996-2001 suggest that efficiency of SOEs has continued to deteriorate during this period
and in contrast, efficiency of private firms in China has exhibited a rather robust
improvement after 1998.
Chapter 5 also adds insights on the effectiveness of Chinese SOE non-ownership
reform and privatization policies on technical efficiency. It shows that any attempts aimed
at reviving Chinese SOEs’ technical efficiency without seriously challenging the state
control may be insufficient to improve efficiency and that their effectiveness, if any, is at
most modest. After decades of SOE reform in China, as of 2001, most of the reformed
SOEs are still subject to soft-budget constraint and social obligations and consequently
the efficiency outcomes of these reforms have been largely undermined.
Although much have been accomplished, the limitations of this study are still
obvious. First, given the time periods covered by the data, we are unable to estimate and
study the latest trend of privatization in China. After 2001, privatization had become a
favorable alternative to other SOEs reform schemes. However, following the policy of
“retain the big and let go of the small”, privatization and internal restructuring have
considerably slowed at those large remaining SOEs. Therefore, it would be interesting to
compare the effects of enterprise reforms before and after 2001 if more data would be
available in the future. Second, it is hard to arrive at a reliable conclusion on firms’ post-
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privatization performance since our data only include 7 years. Third, without more
information on managers’ characteristics or internal governance of firms, the choice for
instrumental variables is highly restricted. For example, if information on years of
managers’ education is available, it can be an ideal instrumental variable for Chapter 4’s
estimation. Lastly, firms surveyed in this study are most likely medium size companies.
Therefore, the findings of this study inevitably suffer from sampling bias and may not
fully reflect the effectiveness of enterprise reform in China from 1995 to 2001.
Our inquiry into the impacts of enterprise reforms on Chinese firms’ performance
is far from completion. The future research plan may include finding a strategy to
estimate the effects of reforms on firms’ allocative efficiency, using non-conventional
approach to examine the effects of reforms, such as Bayesian stochastic frontier models,
or focusing on intertemporal changes in efficiency at remaining large SOEs after 2001.
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